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This article is one of a series that reassesses the dhāraṇī texts of Mahāyāna
Buddhism. The article seeks to examine dhāraṇī texts by using the linguis-
tic tools of pragmatics, especially historical pragmatics, to assist the under-
standing of their statements. Rather than the meaning of the term dhāraṇī
as a subject term, the domain of truth-conditional semantics, this paper
examines statements in texts labelled dhāraṇī. Pragmatics examines mean-
ing in context, and the categories of speech acts developed by Searle has
been especially helpful in mapping out differences within such texts and
the formalization of statements across texts. The grammaticalization of
specific speech elements, especially interjections, in the context of
mantra-dhāraṇīs is also discussed.
Keywords: Mantra, Dhāraṇī, Historical pragmatics, Tantra, Buddhism,
Speech acts
In a previous study of dhāraṇī literature, my primary concern was with the seman-
tics of the term dhāraṇī (Davidson 2009). There I argued that the term had been
somewhat misunderstood or presented in a one-sided manner. In the ensuing
period, I have become satisfied that a rough approximation of the semantic con-
tours of the term dhāraṇī are contained in that study.2 Certainly, there is much
more to be said with respect to the conventional semantics of dhāraṇī, and
there is little doubt that refinements to my presentation will be necessary as
new documents are explored. Among the many things missing in my cursory
examination is an investigation of the other linguistic aspects of dhāraṇī use in
India. One in particular begs to be addressed: the pragmatics of those expressions
and textual sections belonging to the literary genre of dhāraṇī texts. While the pre-
vious study examined the semantic value of the term dhāraṇī as a subject term, the
topic of this study will be statements found in dhāraṇī texts themselves.
To that end, this paper will present briefly the emerging discipline of histori-
cal pragmatics and its applicability to Indian Buddhist documents. It will outline
1 I thank George Thompson for glancing at the Vedic-related sections of the paper, a
branch of Indology about which I have much uncertainty. I also thank Sean Gleason
for suggestions on the pragmatics, especially grammaticalization. An anonymous
reviewer also provided several useful suggestions. Needless to say, I remain responsible
for all errors, great and small.
2 Independently, Copp (2008) arrived at similar conclusions, based on translations into
Chinese.
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a rough approximation of what may be said about the pragmatics of dhāraṇī
statements found in the Mahāyānist scriptures containing dhāraṇīs, including
texts from both early and later periods and admitting of data from other cat-
egories of spells (mantra, hrḍaya, vidyā). At the same time, some other linguis-
tic phenomena will be brought into the discussion, especially questions of
syntax, semantic change and grammaticalization, as these are entailed by prag-
matics. In the process, the alternative voices of either grammatical or Mīmāṃsā
pragmatic observations will be engaged on those few occasions where approp-
riate; one may indeed argue that analyses of pragmatics have been part of the
discussion in Indian religion for quite some time. In our instance, however,
their hermeneutics will be found to be not entirely appropriate in several
respects. Only occasionally do we see that either grammatical, Mīmāṃsā or
Smārta formulae provide guidance to the emerging Buddhist dhāraṇī literature.
Three inhibitions to the study of dhāraṇī pragmatics have occasionally been
voiced. First is the idea that dhāraṇī literature encodes the personal inspiration of
an individual, thus making the examination of implication and performance
superfluous. According to this idea, the expression of the dhāraṇī is a conse-
quence of individual inspiration apart from social or linguistic conventions.
Second, there is the position that – as sacred phrases – mantras or dhāraṇīs can-
not be considered with the same tools as other forms of language use.3 In this
model, because mantras are sacred, they are categorically different from other
kinds of linguistic expression, so that our linguistic tools cannot be applied to
them. Consequently, the pioneering studies of mantra by Gonda (1963) and
Wayman (1975) – as well as more recent works by Padoux (1989), Patton
(1995), and Wilke and Moebus – emphasized the ideology of mantras: the
emic classifications, particular attributes, postulated values and sonic theology.
This position appeared more compelling when scholars such as Staal empha-
sized the idea of the meaninglessness of mantras (anarthaka) because discus-
sions in the Nirukta or Jaiminimīmāṃsā-sūtra seem to coincide with a
3 In their otherwise interesting and informative study, Sound and Communication, after
broadly gesturing to pragmatic analysis, Wilke and Moebus (2011) maintain that:
“However, speech act theory is insufficient to explain mantras fully, because they are
regarded as effective of themselves. The mantras bring us to a radically participatory
interpretation of language and to true language acts, i.e. to a use of language that can
be categorized in speech act theory and yet at the same time goes beyond it. If, for
example, the formula ‘for my life’ is spoken over the rice cooked on the daily sacrificial
fire, this formula is effective of itself, owing to the sacrificial context. In the understand-
ing of the Indian priest, mantras are therefore not a speech act at all in the strict sense. It
is not the priest who performs something through language, i.e. brings about the blessing.
The blessing is brought about by the formula itself ” (p. 406). This is an example of the
conflation of etic and emic perspectives, so that mantras cannot be assessed by modern
linguistic tools. A very different tack is taken by Wheelock (1982), but with a similar
result: rituals cannot be evaluated with standard categories but require their own – his
“situating speech” category; this is because he categorizes language as necessarily com-
municating information. Suffice it to say that this “situating” category has not been
accepted by others, even if many reference his paper. Wheelock’s is a relatively early
attempt to wrestle with the specific parameters of ritual speech acts, but does not ade-
quately take into account the position that Austin’s and Searle’s typologies, whatever
their difficulties, were expressly developed to account for ritual(ized) speech.
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semantic (truth-conditional) definition of meaning, so that mantras appeared
outside of natural language.4 Finally, there is the issue of the conservative reti-
cence of those handling Indian Buddhist ritual documents either to encounter the
Indian world at large or to employ new methods available for their use.5
In response, I would like to suggest that the data on formalized religious lin-
guistic expressions support the position that Indian Buddhist ritual language is
an irreducibly social phenomenon, and that to read these texts as individually
expressed and personally sanctified phrases is to overlook the processes of
their formation and employment.6 It may be germane to point out that
Biblical, Patristic and Classical studies are in advance of Indian Buddhist studies
in this regard. Following in their philological footsteps, I will argue that it is
imperative to take such formulaic expressions out of their “sacred” category
and examine them as natural vocal events. Curiously, Vedic exegesis in part
even supports this examination, arguing that both Vedic mantras and natural
language operate with the same denotation.7 To that end, the results of the
last several decades of pragmatic investigation into language use will be
invoked, not because this discipline is the final word on such phrases, but
because it has not yet been adequately employed.8
Semantics or historical pragmatics?
In this light, the difference between the semantic study of the materials and their
pragmatic study might be clarified. It is common to trot out Morris’s now rather
shopworn tripartite definition of semiotics as divided into semantics, pragmatics
4 Staal (2008): 142–5, 191–221; Nirukta 1.15 or Jaiminimīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.2.1, 1.2.32–3.
Truth-conditional definitions of meaning are behind Staal’s various discussions of mean-
ing, whether the meaninglessness of ritual or of mantras, and represent a somewhat dated
understanding of how meaning is understood in more current linguistic descriptions.
Even then we could question the validity of the “meaningless” designation, since Staal
discusses this with respect to Vedic mantras, which fall into the category of natural
language (and therefore truth-conditional expressions), even if untrue. There would
seem to be a problem in identifying both the intension and extension of the term anartha
with the English term “meaningless”.
5 An example of this is Manné (1990), who formulates her own categories of scripture
instead of tapping into the rich cross-cultural studies of scriptural analysis. In distinction,
Grey (1994: 481–521) provides multiple references to well-established indices of folk-
tale/folk literature. I thank Daniel Boucher for his generosity in providing a copy of Grey.
6 Mention must be made of McDermott’s (1975) “Towards a pragmatics of mantra recita-
tion”, a very early study that attempted much in a very short address of so many issues.
Unfortunately this study is dated in at least three ways: it came at a very early stage in the
history of pragmatics when many of its concerns, including historical pragmatics, had not
developed; it does not study the nature of mantras themselves but focuses on their recita-
tion, thus putting the cart before the horse in my estimation; and it is insufficiently
grounded in the Buddhist mantra archive to understand the conflicted goal orientations
of mantra use. Nonetheless, it was a courageous first enterprise and acknowledged that
quotidian speech acts and mantra recitation were at least subject to family resemblances
(p. 283).
7 Nirukta 1.16; Jaiminimīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.3.30; Taber 1989: 149–53.
8 It is fair to say that Staal seemed to realize that pragmatics represented a threat to his
model of meaning; this may in part be the reason for the somewhat dismissive attitude
to pragmatic analysis taken in his work; Staal 1989: 66–70; 2008: 205–07.
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and syntax (McDermott 1975), but the field of linguistics has developed so sig-
nificantly in the last half century that this division is no longer as applicable as it
once was. One needs but a modest review of the literature to realize that prag-
matic use influences syntactic, semantic and phonological developments over
time. Recent work has highlighted both the difference between semantics per
se, and the effervescence of the study of discourse in situ (pragmatics), while
still acknowledging a mutual patterning. In Recanati’s description:
The view I have just described is very widespread and deserves to be
called the Standard Picture (SP). It enables the theorist to maintain the
three assumptions listed at the beginning of this section. (i.e.) Semantics
and pragmatics each has its own field of study. Semantics deals with literal
meaning and truth conditions; pragmatics deals with speech acts and
speaker’s meaning. (Recanati 2004: 452)
Yet most scholars in the study of pragmatics today realize that these divisions are
more heuristic than easily identifiable, and that language in general is resistant to
typologies with hard boundaries.9 Still, it is relatively clear that meaning may be
inferred, implied or contextually determined in a manner that truth-conditional
semantics has had difficulty delineating (Levinson 1983, Roberts 2004). So if
one takes the sentence: “John can write his name well”, by truth-conditional
semantics this statement is true or false if John can write his name well. But
if it is uttered in response to a question as to whether John is a good
Sanskritist, it clearly implies that he is not, if the best that can be said is that
he can write his name well. As Traugott and others have argued (Traugott
and Dasher 2002, Blutner 2004), semantic change often follows on the heels
of pragmatic use, so that the development of idioms, technical applications,
slang and other semantic variations are often first defined in context, only
later to enter the lexicon in a conventionalized form.
Over the last half century, forms of pragmatics have developed tools that will
help shed light on some of the problems we must consider, and one of these,
speech act theory, has been particularly fruitful. As is now very well known,
Austin’s typology of speech acts (Austin 1962: 151–64) has been employed,
changed or modified by several scholars, but Searle’s schematism appears to
be the best known and most widely applied, even if it is still occasionally con-
tested. Searle divided speech acts (i.e. illocutionary acts) into five types, empha-
sizing the verbal force associated with each (Searle 1969, 1979; Searle and
Vanderveken 1985). In his typology, there are: (1) assertive statements, affirm-
ing or proposing a specific truth statement; (2) commissive statements, commit-
ting the person to a specific performance or act; (3) directive statements,
attempting to command or otherwise to direct the listener to an action; (4)
declarative statements, making declarations that alter the state of the social com-
munity; and (5) expressive statements, one person revealing to another a
9 Culpeper (2010: 78), in speaking of the realms of historical sociopragmatics, historical
linguistics, pragma-historical linguistics, and other disciplines, affirms “It is important
to stress that these areas of study are fuzzy-edged and often overlapping” (similarly
Recanti 2004).
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psychological attitude. As may be suspected, these are primarily determined by
the verbal force, and Searle has articulated multiple instances of English versions
of such statements. In some measure, these can be transposed into Indic struc-
tures. An example of (1) assertives might be any one of the many religious
truth claims (darśana); of (2) commissives might be the vows or promises
(vrata, samaya) found in Indian religious texts; of (3) directives would be sen-
tences employing the imperative and optative verbs or their gerundive adjectival
forms; of (4) declaratives would be the formal statements that open or close cer-
emonies or confer consecration, coronation or other ceremonial functions; and of
(5) expressives would be the first person expressions of sincerity in confessions,
praise, congratulations, condemnations and so forth.
This or related typologies have been employed by various Vedic scholars,
notably Wheelock 1982, Patton 1995, Findly 1989, Thompson 1998, Ilieva
(2003), Taber and, more recently, Dahl (2008). (We note that other scholars
like Houben (2000) and Proferes (2003) have used the term pragmatics in a
ritual-performative rather than a linguistic sense.) The contributions of these
and other scholars mark quite an advance over previous work, for they have
not only attempted to apply the observations of Austin, Searle and others to the
problem of Vedic statements, but have articulated indigenous linguistic cat-
egories and noted areas where English-language based systems are a poor fit.
However, in the application of speech act linguistics to the study of documents,
there is a disturbing tendency either to misuse speech act theory or to provide an
empty gesture to speech acts in particular, as Gorman has discussed in terms of
literary criticism (Gorman 1999; also Gaskill 2008). Additionally, Searle’s
typology has not gone unchallenged, whether in light of ritual use or for ordin-
ary language expressions (e.g. Wheelock 1982, Stiles 1981, Siebel 2003,
Hughes 1984). Wheelock, for example, has argued that speech-act theory is pri-
marily formulated to deal with vernacular social expressions, that is, sentences
and situations that are modern and familiar. His analysis has not received
wide acceptance for various reasons, but it does beg the question of the relation-
ship of ritual repetition to other formalized expressions.
Even with such legitimate reservations in mind, it is appropriate to engage
the questions about the pragmatic use of Indian texts, in this case Indian
Buddhist texts, ever cognizant of limitations. Perhaps more important, prag-
matics is concerned with the changes of fields of meaning that happen in con-
versational contexts, in which social interactions have presuppositions,
understand the implicatures, sense the discontinuities between what is said
and what is meant, to mention but a few of the topics associated with prag-
matics analysis. In dealing with historical documents, many, if not most, of
these factors are not clear or transparent. But such conceptual obscurity
does not mean that the questions are unimportant, and indeed I would
argue that the opacity of the discourse structures we deal with should invite
us to seek out contextual understanding, even while acknowledging that it
is fraught with uncertainties, some of which will remain contested or intract-
able over time.
In response to these and similar needs, linguists with a philological back-
ground began to apply pragmatic tools and procedures to historical texts, devel-
oping the discipline now known as “historical pragmatics”. Andreas Jucker and
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Elizabeth Traugott, in particular, started to employ such strategies to examine
works, first in English and then expanded to other languages, yielding a growing
series of studies and eventually the founding of the Journal of Historical
Pragmatics. Jacobs and Jucker (1995: 6) describe the field in the following
manner:
Historical pragmatics deals with changes in the linguistic structure result-
ing from altered communicative needs which are due to changes in the
social structure, or, in other words, with changes in traditions of language
use resulting from changes in the situational context, e.g. the institutiona-
lisation or a medium of change. Hence the aims of a historically conceived
pragmatics include (1) the description and the understanding of conven-
tions of language use in communities that once existed and that are no
longer accessible for direct observation, and (2) the description and the
explanation of the development of speech conventions in the course of
time. However, historical pragmatics can also be used as a philological
tool to explain literary artefacts from the past.
This latter is true in the pursuit of “pragmaphilology”, (1) above, further defined
by Jacobs and Jucker (1995: 11):
Pragmaphilology goes one step further and describes the contextual
aspects of historical texts, including the addressers and addressees, their
social and personal relationship, the physical and social setting of text pro-
duction and text reception and the goal(s) of the text.
Pragmaphilology is understood to be a “macro approach”, emphasizing altera-
tions in the sociocultural conditions wherein speech acts occur. In distinction,
the other form (2) above, “diachronic pragmatics”, is identified as a “micro
approach” (Traugott 2004: 538). Jacobs and Jucker (1995: 13) understand that:
diachronic pragmatics focuses on the linguistic inventory and its commu-
nicative use across different historical stages of the same language. Within
the diachronic studies it is possible to distinguish two subtypes. Some
studies may take a linguistic form (such as discourse markers, relative pro-
nouns or lexical items) as a starting point in order to investigate the chan-
ging discourse meanings of the chosen element or elements, while the
other subtype takes the speech functions (such as a specific speech act
or politeness) as their starting point in order to investigate the changing
realizations of this function across time.
The application of the discipline of historical pragmatics to the study of dhāraṇīs
would seem at first blush to be immediately apparent, for investigations into all
of these circumstances remain desiderata: the changing nature of Buddhist dis-
course, the macro social environment of India, the intermediate social environ-
ment of Buddhist monasteries and their support communities, the smaller
environments of Mahayanist groups employing such phrases and placing
them in their scriptures, to mention but the more urgent. This essay will be
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one – certainly incomplete and probably faulty – attempt at applying the methods
of historical pragmatics to a few of the many dhāraṇī texts in our archive.
Dhāraṇī pragmatic divisions
Dhāraṇī literature is sufficiently complex to resist easy categorization, which is
part of the reason it is simultaneously so interesting and so frustrating. However,
in terms of its pragmatic contextualization, we can say that the presentation of
dhāraṇī texts often divides into several relatively discrete types of statement.
(a) First, we find precipitating assertives, whether articulating a problem con-
dition or a miraculous event. (b) Second, we will consider the directive to
speak or perform the dhāraṇī, with the verb in the imperative or rarely in the
optative. (c) Third, we find commissive statements promising to communicate
a dhāraṇī. (d) Fourth, we have assertives in the forms of precedent or predictive
statements, extolling the use of this dhāraṇī or vidyā or hrḍaya by a/some/many
previous Buddhas, and many include a predictive statement that it will be
preached in the present or future as well. (e) Fifth, we find assertives as benefit
statements, usually about the dhāraṇī’s power as a prophylactic against disease,
poison, possession, or enemies, but also as an affirmation of health, welfare or
even soteriological efficacy. (f) Sixth, we find assertive hybrid warning state-
ments. (g) Seventh, there are the ubiquitous expressives: praise, homage, confes-
sion, condemnation, etc. (h) Eighth, we find perlocutionary expressives or
assertives, about the joy and amazement of the audience who received this
dhāraṇī, and occasionally other, sometimes less beneficial perlocutionary senti-
ments are indicated. (i) Ninth, we find the mantra-dhāraṇī itself, specifying the
phrase to be recited. I simply employ the term mantra-dhāraṇī as a designation
to differentiate it from the larger dhāraṇī text, and in recognition that it is a term
employed in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (272.23–273.3), so as to avoid a neologism;
the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka employs both the designations mantra-dhāraṇī
(397.3) and dhāraṇī-mantra (396.3, 398.3, 399.9, 400.1, 401.1), which are
equally clear. Other texts employ analogous designations.10
Readers of Buddhist scriptures will notice that many, perhaps most, of the
items in the list (a)–(i) will have been employed in previous Buddhist texts as
part of the overall textual strategy. Their presence in dhāraṇī texts serves to
reinforce the authenticity and legitimacy of these works. As Austin pointed
out, in terms of speech acts:
There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain con-
ventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by
certain persons in certain circumstances. (Austin 1962: 26; see also Sbisà
2009)
Mutatismutandis, allowing for the changed circumstances of ritualworks, the newer
Mahāyāna dhāraṇī texts were expected to emulatewell-established paradigms. That
10 Mahāpratisarā §36 imāni dhāraṇīmantrapadāni bhāsịtāni. Similar use, Vasudhārādhāraṇī
pp. 143, 146.
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does not mean theywere necessarily successful in this process, and under section (d)
we will discuss the problem of uptake and its success or failure.
One caveat should be expressed, precipitated by the discussion of ritual order
articulated by the late Frits Staal. As is well known, Staal argued that ritual order
is meaningless, by which I understand him to have meant that ritual units can be
rearranged syntactically without affecting their semantic value (Staal 1986a,
1986b, 2008). His model is grounded in the linguistic background of transforma-
tional grammar, which in its more extreme forms argues that syntactic units may
be rearranged without a substantial change in semantic value. Here, pragmatics
certainly has something to say, as contextual use and statement order are impor-
tant. Consequently, the above list should not be taken as somehow indicative of
either the respective place or the precise importance of such items in a specific
dhāraṇī text. As the analysis unfolds, it will be clear that these items are some-
times shifted about. Their relocation, however, carries with it a degree of prag-
matic significance, and I would argue that – just as in relocating specific items to
the beginning of an English sentence may indicate emphasis – the pragmatic
force is somewhat different for such items depending on their respective
locations. Ideally, each text should be considered independently as an assem-
blage of pragmatic signifiers.
Nonetheless, we may also note that the position-related differences in
pragmatic force are moderated to some degree because of the process of forma-
lization. In addition to the attributes of formalism – redundancy and parallelism –
already identified by others, Irvine listed four further qualities of formality that
appear cross-culturally valid: increased code structuring; code consistency; the
invocation of positional identities; and the emergence of a central situational
focus (Irvine 1979: 774–9; Howell 1986). These are apparent in the codification
of language, the consistency (intertextuality) of expression, the recognition of
hierarchical relationships accompanied by attendant politeness concerns, and
the transmission of the mantra-dhāraṇī itself as the central focus. Tambiah
(1979) saw many of these same formalization functions in the anthropology
of the rituals he examined, providing a modern, vernacular model to the textual
Sanskrit with which we are concerned. Consequently, in light of the issues of
formalization, we would best consider the items (a) to (i) across texts, for the
formalization of language yields a pragmatic force that has echoes in other
texts with which the hearer/reader would have been familiar.
In selecting items for examination, it would be well to foreground two basic
concerns. First, the fundamental, important scriptural statements should be given
preference over less central, peripheral statements. That is, those scriptures with
the greatest overall resonance in the Indian Buddhist tradition should be the
initial field of investigation. This would ideally be determined by a system
of weighting based on reference, commentary, translation and actual ritual use
in the period in question, to mention but the more obvious parameters.
Unfortunately, in the absence of any rigorous quantification of such variables,
this weighting must remain an idealized aspiration rather than an easily realized
placement system. Yet it is reasonably easy to identify the most important of the
Mahāyāna scriptures that employ dhāraṇīs or similar phrases (hrḍaya, vidyā
often re-branded as dhāraṇīs) for these are the ones for which there is generally –
albeit not always – some surviving Sanskrit version. And that gives rise to the
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second concern. The analysis would best avoid translated texts (Chinese,
Tibetan, etc.) at this time for its primary data, although these may be employed
to assist the resolution of some questions of earlier recension, semantic value,
pragmatic use, and so on. Nonetheless, having some surviving Sanskrit text is
better than no Sanskrit text in this instance – particularly if there is a translation
to validate early use – as so much of the pragmatic force of the statements is
encoded in the nuance of the Sanskrit vocabulary, as I hope will be clear in
the ensuing discussion. These two concerns, however, do lessen the textual
field considerably. Moreover, explicitly dhāraṇī literature frequently employs
phrases and ritual statements also found in other spell genres (mantra, vidyā,
hrḍaya) that are not always termed dhāraṇī, but that nonetheless share common-
alities with the literature so designated. This other spell literature will conse-
quently be exploited in the discussion.
Finally, experienced readers of dhāraṇī works will note one or more textual
features missing in the (a)–(i) list given above. In response, I would beg the
reader’s indulgence; the items (a)–(i) are not exhaustive and represent the stan-
dard phrases I find most commonly expressed in dhāraṇī literature overall. This
essay is simply a preliminary attempt at mapping them linguistically. As the
dhāraṇī texts become longer – as the sixth- to eighth-century texts translated
into Chinese and Tibetan attest – they become more complex and the kinds
of statements have greater variation. One particular lapse in my agenda is con-
stituted by the vidhi, vidhāna, kalpa or sādhana ritual materials, even though
they are sometimes found side-by-side with the above sections. Such vidhi
materials form the ritual instructions for the construction of an altar (sthaṇḍila,
maṇḍala), offering materials to one or another figure, and over time come to
include homa, bali and other offerings. The primary reasons for this neglect
are threefold: first, it appears that the earliest of the dhāraṇī works and chapters
in texts do not include such ritual specificity, which is itself a problem in under-
standing how these dhāraṇī materials were to be employed at their earliest
phases. Second, it is increasingly clear to me that such rituals are grounded
either in the grḥya literature of the Smārta Vedic traditions or in the popular
forms of yaksạ, nāga or other local spirit cults and must be resolved in relation
to those sources as much as can be. Establishing this relationship is such a com-
plicated task that it should be reserved for another occasion. Third, the structures
of vidhi rituals are such that they do not materially contribute to the discussions
of pragmatics as more commonly encountered in the dhāraṇī texts.
Consequently, as interesting as such vidhi literature is, it must be reluctantly
set aside. Indeed, I envision the process of dhāraṇī pragmatic taxonomy as a pre-
lude to the examination of these more complex rituals.
A. Precipitating assertives
In the imagined narrative at the beginning of dhāraṇī texts, there is sometimes
an event said to precipitate the expression of the dhāraṇī. If such a narrative is
present, the nature of the event is sometimes a problem condition, either per-
sonal or social. In the former instance, we find the assertion that monks encoun-
ter afflictions having either supernormal or natural causes that exceed the
Saṃgha’s ability to control. So Svāti in both the Bhaisạjyavastu and the
Mahāmāyūrī goes wandering into the religious life and becomes snake-bitten,
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a common enough circumstance and emblematic of a larger sphere of afflictions
regularly encountered in South Asia, whether from insects, snakes, disease, fever
or from some affliction not falling into the canon of modern medicine.
sa kāsṭḥaṃ pātạyitum ārabdho yāvad anyatamasmāt pūtidārususịrān
nisḳramyāśīvisẹṇa daksịṇe pādānġusṭḥe drṣṭạḥ | sa visẹṇa saṃmūrchito
bhūmau patito lālā vāhayati mukhaṃ ca vibhaṇḍayati aksịṇī ca saṃpari-
vartayati |
Bhaisạjyavastu 285.14–1711
He [Svāti] began to break off some wood, and just then from another putrid
piece of hollow wood a poisonous snake emerged and bit him in the big
toe of his right foot. He passed out from the venom, fell to the ground,
spit up saliva, his face distorted, and his eyes rolling back in his head.
A less salubrious approach is taken in the case of Surasundarī, the wife of the
cakravartin Utpalavaktra, in innumerable kalpas in the past, as found in the
Ratnaketuparivarta. The karmic tale (pūrvayoga) is related by Śākyamuni in order
to remove doubt about the relationship between karma and consequences (p. 33.2:
karmapratyaya esạ drasṭạvyaḥ). With her thousand ladies-in-waiting, she comes
to offer to Jyotiḥsomyagandhāvabhāsaśrī Tathāgata, and they ask him to explain
the deathless path to beneficial states devoid of obscuration (p. 37.7: vada vitimira-
sugatipatham amrṭam). In reply Jyotiḥsomyagandhāvabhāsaśrī offers them the
ratnaketudhāraṇīwhichwill transform them from the female to themale state, imply-
ing that the author believed the feminine condition to be the emblem of their karmic
defilements (karmāvaraṇa), existing as their problem condition.12
Assertives of supernormal causes, as understood by modern standards, would
include the case of Ānanda’s falling under the control of a witch in the
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna.13 The categories of natural and supernormal, however,
are modern, and they sometimes seem to be represented with similar statements
in dhāraṇī documents, as in the case of Rāhula’s affliction in the
Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī:
śītavane mahāśmaśāne inġhikāyatanapratyuddeśe tatrāyusṃān rāhulo
’tīva vihetḥyate | devagrahair nāgagrahair yaksạgrahai rāksạgrahair
11 Bhaisạjyavastu p. 285.14–17; To. 1, vol. ga, fol. 48b6–7; I have been unable to locate the
Svāti story in T.1448 translated by Yijing.
12 As the editor notes, the verses given in Kurumiya pp. 36–7 are corrupt, and I suspect that
they may have been initially composed in Prakrit and then roughly rendered into
Sanskrit. The Tibetan follows the received text to some degree (fol. 201b4–7) but
Dharmaksẹma’s translation articulates the timira problem (normally understood as an
ocular disease) differently: 云何令我離女身, “tell me how I can get rid of the female
body?”
13 Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna pp. 1–7; this episode has been attached to the beginning of the
avadāna but was a self-contained narrative called the Matanġī-sūtra, for which there
are four translations into Chinese: T. 551, 552, 1300, 1301. It is interesting that the
trope of women (here Māra’s daughters) trying to use spells to capture four Arhats
(Śāriputra, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, Maitrāyaṇīputra and Subhūti) is explored in the
Ratnaketuparivarta, pp. 62–71. Unlike the hapless Ānanda, none of the Arhats are so
captivated.
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marutagrahair asuragrahair kinnaragrahair garuḍagrahair gandharva-
grahair mahoragagrahair manusỵagrahair amanusỵagrahair pretagra-
hair bhūtagrahaiḥ piśācagrahaiḥ kumbhāṇḍagrahair dvīpibhiḥ kākair
ulūkaiḥ kītạiḥ sarīsrp̣air anyaiś ca manusỵāmanusỵaiḥ satvaiḥ |
Mahāśītavatī 1.4–1014
Rāhula was living in the Śītavana cemetery in the Iṅghikāyatana region
and was tormented by possessive spirits among the gods, among the
nāgas, among the yaksạs, among the rāksạsas, among the maruts,
among the asuras, among the kinnaras, among the garuḍas, among the
gandharvas, among the mahoragas, among the humans and non-humans,
among the pretas, among the bhūtas, among the piśācas, among the
kumbhāṇḍas, and also tormented by leopards, crows, owls, insects, ser-
pents, and by other beings, human and non-human.
Identifiably supernormal events include the appearance of catastrophic portents
at the beginning of the Mahāsāhasraparmardanī:
tena khalu punaḥ samayena vaiśālyāṃ mahānagaryāṃ mahān bhūmicālo
’bhūd abhrakūtạṃ ca prādurbhūtam | mahatī cākālavātāśanir
mahāmeghaś ca samutthito devo garjati guḍaguḍāyati vidyutaś ca
niścaranti | daśadiśaś cākulībhūtās tamo ’ndhakāraṃ ca prādurbhūtam
| naksạtrāṇi ca na bhāsạnte | candrasūryau na prabhavato na tapato na
virocato na ca prabhāsvarau bhavataḥ ‖ Mahāsāhasraparmardanī
1.20–2515
Then, you should realize that at that time, in the great city of Vaiśālī there
was a great earthquake, and a tower of cloud appeared. And a massive
inauspicious wind and lightning occurred, with a great cloud the rain
god stood up roaring, as if with rumbling in his belly, and thunderbolts
scattered everywhere. In all the ten directions, everyone became perplexed,
and a darkness akin to night appeared. But there were no constellations
visible. Nor did the sun or moon shine, or provide heat, or illuminate or
reveal their brilliance.16
Some of themore significant statements about similar portents have to dowith fend-
ing off the work of Māra, and one episode turns the narrative around. At one time,
towards the end of the Ratnaketuparivarta, Māra and all his minions appear before
14 Mahāśītavatī, p. 1.4–10; apparently there is an alternative title to the work, reflected in
the Tibetan translation, Mahādaṇḍa-dhāraṇī, To. 606, fol. 37a3–6; T. 1392.21.908b13–
16; Mahāśītavanavidyārājñīsūtraśatasahasratị̄kā, To. 2693, fols. 285b6–290b3. Note
that this is not the same text as the Mahāśītavana-sūtra, To. 562.
15 Mahāsāhasraparmardanī, p. 1.20–25; read bhāsante for bhāsạnte; To. 558, fol. 63a6–b1
and we note that the translators read mahāmeghaś ca devo garjati as indicating rain:
sprin chen po las char pa chen po yang ’bab par gyur; T. 999.19.578b21–25;
Mahāsāhasrapramardanīsūtraśatasahasratị̄kā T. 2690, fols. 8b7–9b1.
16 The author has employed crisis language found elsewhere, as in the Mahāvadāna (p. 52)
/ Mahāpadāna (p. 12) at the descent of Vipaśyin into his mother’s womb; for the
relationship of the seven Buddhas to dhāraṇīs, see Davidson forthcoming.
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the Buddha and pay homage.17 The Bodhisattva Kautūhalika asks if Māra has had a
change of heart, but the Buddha replies in the negative. Just then, an entity called
Agasti-māra comes before the Buddha, prays that if any of Māra’s minions should
appear, may that agent of distress have no power. Agasti-māra then utters a dhāraṇī,
which yields those results, based on the power of his previous aspiration.
This episode builds on a wider theme throughout the spell scriptures: while
there are spirits, yaksạs, nāgas, kumbhāṇḍas, and so on, who have decided to pro-
tect the Dharma, there are many, many more demons, spirits and such like, who
are not so beneficent, and this sets up the need for the expression of mantras to
be used as apotropaic aids in warding off the less benign elements of the preter-
natural mob. So one of the oldest of the Buddhist apotropaic scriptures, the
Ātạ̄nātịka-sūtra, provides various mantras to ward off the effects of the several
demons, with the problem of their potential trouble as the specific motivation.18
Likewise, the Ratnaketuparivarta picks up the same theme to provide the motiv-
ation for the expression of the vajrakhavasari, a mantra-dhāraṇī that is both the
essence of all demons and equally capable of overcoming a daunting list of
denizens of the spirit world.19 Other kinds of assertive narratives certainly
occur, some miraculous. A number of dhāraṇī texts indeed specify no difficulty
that the dhāraṇī is to solve, but instead begin with a supernatural occurrence
(prātihārya) that suddenly appears, either through the action of Śākyamuni or
from some other source. So the Sarvajñatākāra-dhāraṇī begins by the
Bodhisattva Ratnavairocana noting the sudden appearance of beams of light and
asking its source (p. 7: paramāścaryābhūt tatprāpto ’haṃ bhagavan kuta ime
raśmaya āgatāḥ | kasyaisạ visạya prabhāva | ko ’tra hetupratyayo bhavisỵati |).
The precipitating assertives function as specific kinds of graphic linguistic acts
in the text, acts that prompt individuals to take further action, especially the
Buddha but also specific Bodhisattvas, the four Great Kings (catur mahārāja),
and various other entities, as we will see. The supposition is that the various
Buddhist entities will respond to such difficulties, amazing circumstances, or
almost anything incomprehensible or out of the ordinary. To be sure, not all of
the dhāraṇī texts provide such narratives – they simply relate the
mantra-dhāraṇī and are done with the matter – but many of the dhāraṇī texts
take great pains to establish a complex social world in which the expectation is
that the Buddha, as one of great compassion (mahākāruṇika), will be certain
that his followers are equipped with the tools necessary to provide for their needs.
In this regard, the assertives establish the need for mantra-dhāraṇīs within the
context of an extremely conservative institution; Buddhists have voiced the
assumption that innovations are acceptable to the degree that they are responses
to difficulties or circumstances bereft of other forms of control. This idea goes
back to the earliest level of the tradition, and the Buddha is said to have affirmed
that he did not initiate a new rule without there being a cause.
17 Ratnaketuparivarta chapter XI, pp. 158–64; To. 138 fols. 265b2–271a7; T. 397
(9).13.150b27151c25.
18 Ātạ̄nātịkasūtra, pp. 32–67 (original pagination), after which the mantras are expressed;
see the discussion of this scripture in Skilling 1994–97, vol. 2, pp. 553–79.
19 Ratnaketuparivarta chapter XII, pp. 165–71; this chapter transparently references the
earlier sūtra by featuring Ātạvaka Mahāyaksạsenāpati as the interlocutor.
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na tāva sāriputta satthā sāvakānaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ paññāpeti uddisati
pātimokkhaṃ yāva na idh’ ekacce āsavatṭḥāniyā dhammā saṃghe
pātubhavati.
(Vinaya Texts III.9.28–30)20
It is not the case, Śāriputra, that the Teacher establishes one of the [Vinaya]
rules of instruction or teach the Prātimoksạ to the disciples without some
events appearing in the Saṃgha that operate as the basis for defilement.
Thus, like the Vinaya rules, the dhāraṇīs were therapeutic responses to new
aggravated conditions; they appeared to fit well with the mythology of cosmic
decline and the imminent loss of the Saddharma. The disjuncture, clear from
historical perspective but perhaps not so evident at the time, was that most of
the situations reported in dhāraṇī precipitating assertives have had a long narra-
tive history in the Saṃgha without the necessity for the inauguration of new apo-
tropaic procedures. Thus, the intrusion of vidyās, mantras and other kinds of
spells into the Buddhist canon must have had some measure of social and his-
torical impetus behind whatever mythological motive has been furnished by the
statements of their inauguration.
B. Dhāraṇī directives
Based on such precipitating assertives, we find most dhāraṇī or mantra texts
providing directives to others either to speak or “take up” this spell, whether
for the benefit of selected members or for the entire community. Three of the
dhāraṇī sections – (b) the directive statement, (f) the warning assertive hybrids,
and (i) the actual mantra-dhāraṇī – will have a high degree of variation, but
most of them employ direct or indirect illocutionary directive speech acts and
construct what Mauri and Sansò call “directive strategies”.
By directive strategies we mean constructions and markers that encode
positive directive speech acts, i.e. situations in which the speaker orders
someone to do something . . . As directive speech acts are complex situ-
ations involving different components such as, e.g., the speaker’s wish,
the appeal to the addressee, and the expectation of an imminent actualiza-
tion of the order, the diachronic sources of directive markers include
different strategies originally attested in indirect speech acts and primarily
devoted, among other things, to the expression of futurity/imminence (e.g.,
future constructions), or to the expression of the speaker’s wish (e.g., opta-
tive constructions). (Mauri and Sansò 2011: 3489–90)
Accordingly, while it is clear that the optative and imperative verb forms seen in this
dhāraṇī section implicate such directive strategies, other forms of pragmatic force
mayalsobeuncovered around theBuddha’s command.Moreover, sincewe are deal-
ingwith Indian speech acts, a cautious approachwould require recognition that there
are statements describing pragmatics in some sense within Indian writing overall
20 From the Suttavibhanġa, Vinaya Texts III. 9. 28–30; similarlyBhaddālisutta, Majjhimanikāya
I. 445. 6–8; T. 26. 1. 748a12–24;with a similar purportMūlasarvāstivādavinayavibhanġa, vol.
ca, fol. 28b4–7.
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(Taber 1989, Patton 1995, Thompson 1998). For example, as Taber and Patton have
shown, there is a similarity between the typologies of mantra statements found in
both Smārta and Mīmāṃsā literature on the one hand and the categories described
in pragmatics analysis on the other, even if they cannot be directly equated.
As is well known from a study of both Smārta and Mīmāṃsā literature, the
primary verbal vehicle for orthodox Sanskrit directives is the optative form
(lin)̇, which has the emic illocutionary force of the injunction (codanā). The
seminal Jaiminimīmāṃsā-sūtra recognizes this force in its various applications
of codanā and the commentators affirm that codanā identifies such optative
verbs as “let him sacrifice” (yajeta). (Jaiminmīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.1.2, 2.1.5,
2.1.32 etc., reading with Śabara). Curiously, however, most Buddhist dhāraṇī
directives and mantra-dhāraṇīs or vidyās, appear to prefer the imperative (lot)̣
forms rather than the better recognized optative (lin)̇ of the Smārta and
Mīmāṃsā authorities. In distinction to the Smārta third person indeterminate
“one” or “anyone” (yaḥ or yaḥ kaścit), this directive is usually invoked with
second person direct address (tvam or yūyam), whether expressed or implied.
udgrḥṇa tvam ānanda imāṃ sạḍaksạrīvidyāṃ dhāraya vācaya
paryavāpnuhi|
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna 4.16–17
Take up this six-syllable vidyā, Ānanda, hold it, speak it, master it!
As in this directive, a result of Ānanda’s having been captured by a witch’s spell,
it would appear that the specific directive form is in some measure dependent on
the narrative associated with the text, and whether there is a precipitating event
in which a single person is the principal in the narrative. If there is no narrative
of a precipitating assertive (as in A. above), but the text simply begins by indi-
cating the existence of a mantra-dhāraṇī, then we sometimes see the Buddha
ordering a figure to speak the spell.
atha [khalu bhagavān āryāvalo]kiteśvaraṃ bodhisattvaṃ mahāsatvam
etad avocat ‖ bhāsạ tvaṃ śuddhasatva | yasyedanīṃ kālam manyase ‖
anumoditaṃ tathāgatena paścimena kāle paścime samaye
bodhisatvayānikānāṃ pitrḳāryaṃ karisỵati ‖
Amoghapāśahrḍaya-dhāraṇī 319.
Then you should know that the Lord said this to the Bodhisattva
Mahāsattva Ārya-Avalokiteśvara, “Speak, O pure being, if you think
now the proper time for this! It is approved by the Tathāgata and [the
dhāraṇī] will act as an ancestor for those mounted on the Bodhisattva
vehicle in the later days, in the subsequent days of the Dharma.
If there is a precipitating assertive of a problem or miraculous condition, then the
individual so afflicted may be directed to take up the mantra-dhāraṇī, as Rāhula
is so directed when he is afflicted by all the demons:
udgrḥṇa tvaṃ rāhula imāṃ mahāśītavatī nāma dhāraṇīṃ vidyāṃ |
Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī 2.8
Take up, Rāhula, this spell of the Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī!
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Sometimes the person so directed is not the principal, but instead a senior or
representative person in the Saṃgha who may provide assistance to the individ-
ual afflicted. So the direct address in the Mahāmāyūrī is Ānanda, who is able to
employ the spell to cure Svāti, who has become incapacitated.
evam ukte bhagavān āyusṃantam ānandam etad avocet | gaccha tvam
ānanda tathāgatasya vacanenānayā mahāmāyūryā vidyārājñā svāter
bhiksọ raksạ̄ṃ kuru | guptiṃ paritrāṇaṃ parigrahaṃ paripālanaṃ
śāntiṃ svastyayanaṃ daṇḍaparihāraṃ śastraparihāraṃ visạdūsạṇaṃ
visạnāśanaṃ sīmābandhaṃ dharaṇībandhaṃ ca kuru|
Mahāmāyūrī 3.11–14
This said, the Lord replied thus to Ānanda. “Go, Ānanda, and protect Svāti
the monk with this Great Peacock Spell, the Queen of Spells, [expressed]
by the Tathāgata’s voice! [With it], perform [his] cover, guarding, assist-
ance, shield, pacification, health, warding off punishment, warding off
weapons, removing poison, destroying poison, securing a sacred per-
imeter, and securing the site!”
We also find this conversational imperative use retained in the later dhāraṇīs,
such as the Mahāmantrānusāriṇī.
gacchānanda vaiśālīṃ gatvā indrakīle pādaṃ sthāpayitvā imāni
mahāmantrānusāriṇī mantrapadāni bhāsạsva | imāś ca gāthāḥ |
Mahāmantrānusāriṇī C.1.3
Go, Ānanda, and having reached Vaiśālī, place your foot on the threshold
and recite these mantra words of the Mahāmantrānusāriṇī and these
verses, too.
Likewise the Saṇmukhī-dhāraṇī:
udgrḥṇīdhvaṃ yūyam kulaputrā imāṃ sạṇmukhī-nāma-dhāraṇīṃ
sarvajagaddhitārtham |
Saṇmukhī-dhāraṇī 9.
You must take up, O sons of good family, this Six-door Dhāraṇī for the
sake of the welfare of the entire world.
The imperative use is sowidely distributed that it appears to be employed by the dis-
ciples to request that the Buddha teach in the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī, (p. 94[3]:
ni[rvikalpapraveśāṃ dhāraṇīṃ deśatu bhagavan|]) although this form is recon-
structed by Matsuda from the Tibetan and must be treated with caution.
Nonetheless, that usage is found elsewhere, as when the four Mahārājas revealed
mantras in theMahāsāhasrapramardanī. There, each of them employs the second-
person imperative to direct the Buddha to listen to theirmantrawords (pp. 4–6: tatra
mantrapadāny asti lokanātha śrṇ̣ohi me ‖). But the result is that they become frigh-
tenedwhen theBuddha trumps theirmantras, and so the blunt imperative appears to
set the stage for the Buddha’s unfavourable reception. Elsewhere in the same text,
yaksạs cry out to the Buddha for protection using the third-person imperative
(p. 29.7: trāyatu naḥ śramaṇo gautama), yielding a strong appeal, slightly blunted
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by the more polite third-person form. Thus, the imperative would seem to be gener-
ally associatedwith a direct address andapragmatic force indicating thepresumption
of either hierarchical rank or an increased strength of appeal.
In other areas, we find a distinctive optative use with a third-person indefinite
rather than a second-person definite subject, but this is a commonplace about
benefits in Mahāyāna scriptures. This use is assertive in form but pragmatically
is part of an implicit directive strategy, an extended application acknowledged
by Searle (1979: 28–9). The form is generally found in sections describing
how, whatever son or daughter of good family were to learn, speak, internalize,
broadcast, write or have written even a verse of a scripture, he/she would soon
reach final awakening.21 In many instances, these verbs are all expressed with
optatives, but other verb and participial forms are sometimes present as well.
That optative use occasionally finds expression associated with mantras or
vidyās, as in the Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna,
yaḥ kaścid ānanda sạḍaksạryā vidyayā paritrāṇaṃ svastyayanaṃ kuryāt
sa yadi vadhārho bhavet daṇḍena mucyate | Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna 5.5–7
(To. fol. 234a5)
Whoever,Ānanda, would secure his protection or health with this six-syllable
vidyā, if he is worthy of death, he will be released with a judgment.
However, in none of these instances have I located the optative as an explicit
directive in the manner of the imperative so commonly used.
Interestingly, Pāṇini does not strongly differentiate between the
optative and imperative, and in more than one sūtra he explicitly
identifies their conventional semantics (Asṭạ̄dhyāyī 3.3.161–2:
vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhīsṭạsaṃpraśnārthaneśu lin ̇ | lot ̣ ca |; Asṭạ̄dhyāyī
3.3.173: āśīsị linl̇otạu |). Jayāditya’s examples of both lin ̇ and lot ̣ uses in the
Kāśikāvrṭti commentary on these sūtras are virtually identical, further blurring
the distinction. Nonetheless, as van de Walle has pointed out, the optative is
more closely associated with polite discourse, while the imperative is employed
in slightly more blunt and forceful directives. Between these two stand the gerund-
ive which, Pāṇini indicates, overlaps the optative and imperative meanings, even if
with a passive sense (krṭya: e.g., Asṭạ̄dhyāyī 3.3.163, 169–72). Van de Walle’s
(1993: 104–10) examination of the use of these modal forms affirms that, in
Classical Sanskrit, they are somewhat more nuanced and context-specific than
in the grammarians’ discussion, for the latter are frequently based on Pāṇini.
The politeness value of the optative is recognized in a modal question posed
by the crowd in the Mahāsāhasrapramardanī to the Buddha when faced with
the sudden appearance of a massive cloud and deep darkness, flecked with
21 E.g.,Saddharmapuṇḍarīka pp. 226.3–7. yaḥ khalv asmād dharmaparyāyād antaśa ekagāthām
api dhārayet kaḥ punarvādo ya imaṁ dharmaparyāyaṁ sakalasamāptamudgrḥṇīyād dhārayed
vā vācayed vā paryavāpnuyād vā prakāśayed vā likhed vā likhāpayed vā likhitvā cānusmaret |
tatra ca pustake satkāraṁ kuryāt gurukāraṁ kuryāt mānanāṁ pūjanām arcanām apacāyanāṁ
pusp̣adhūpagandhamālyavilepanacūrṇacīvaracchatradhvajapatākāvādyāñjalinamaskāraiḥ
praṇāmaiḥ | parinisp̣annaḥ sa bhaisạjyarāja kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā ’nuttarāyāṁ samyak-
saṁbodhau veditavyaḥ |
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lightning, “Given that this is the case, how might we be liberated thus from this
fear-inducing calamitous form?” (p. 2.14–15: kathaṃ nāmaitat syād vayam
evaṃ rūpād upadravato bhayasthānāt parimucyema). Here and elsewhere, the
employment of the optative appears to follow the Smārta use that directly ties
optional goals (kāmyakarma) with specific practices. However, it sometimes
blends into the Buddhist use of the imperative, which implies an urgent directive
of the moment, in a determinate time and space.
C. Dhāraṇī commissives
The directive statements are sometimes buttressed with related or supportive
affirmations that various mythic entities will confer these dhāraṇīs on the indi-
viduals identified in the various narratives, or they may support possessors of
such dhāraṇīs with protection and defence, or practise the dhāraṇīs them-
selves.22 Often, the figures protected are dharmabhāṇakas, Mahāyānist preach-
ers who are doubtless the most important of the dhāraṇī patrons and users to be
identified in the scriptures. In this aspect of the frame narrative, the
dharmabhāṇaka or other Mahāyāna supporter will receive instruction in this
or that mantra-dhāraṇī from one or another figure under certain conditions. In
the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, for example, the Bodhisattva Bhaisạjyarāja vows to
offer his dhāraṇī of protection to any person invested in that text.
dāsyāmo vayaṁ bhagavaṁs tesạ̄ṁ kulaputrāṇāṁ kuladuhitr ̣̄ṇāṁ vā
yesạ̄m ayaṁ saddharmapuṇḍarīko dharmaparyāyaḥ kāyagato vā syāt,
pustakagato vā, raksạ̄varaṇaguptaye dhāraṇīmantrapadāni |
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka 396.2–3
We will confer, O Lord, the words of the following dhāraṇī-mantra – for
the purpose of protection, shelter and security – and on any son or daugh-
ter of good family who may have taken this Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, this
teaching of Dharma, and learned by heart or retained as a book.
A variant on this commissive is found in the Sarvatathāgatādhisṭḥāna (§§36–7),
where Vajrapāṇi informs the Buddha of his commitment on behalf of
dharmabhāṇakas in the past and requests (a polite directive; see Archer 2010)
that he be allowed to proclaim his mantra-dhāraṇī in the present, thereby juxta-
posing commissives and directives.
Beyond the specifically Buddhist figures, the various worldly divinities are
shown to pronounce commissives in support of those following the Mahāyāna:
aham api bhadanta bhagavan sarasvatīmahādevī tasya dharmabhāṇakasya
bhiksor vākyavibhūsạnārthāya pratibhāṇaṃ upasaṃharisỵāmi | dhāraṇīṃ
cānupradāsyāmi | suniruktavacanabhāvaṃ saṃbhāvayisỵāmi | mahāntaṃ
ca dharmabhāṇakasya bhiksọr jñānāvabhāsaṃ karisỵāmi | yāni kānicit
padavyañjanāni itaḥ suvarṇabhāsottamāt sūtrendrarājāt paribhrasṭạ̄ni bha-
visỵanti vismaritāni ca | tāny ahaṃ sarvāṇi tasya dhamabhāṇakasya bhiksọḥ
22 The vow to practise the dhāraṇī is found in Mahāpratisarā §30 (Hidas p. 226).
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suniruktapadavyañjanāny upasaṃharisỵāmi | dhāraṇīṃ cānupradāsyāmi
smrṭyasaṃpramosạṇāya |
Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra 102.16–103.6
I too, noble Lord, theGreat Goddess Sarasvatīwill nurture inspiration, for the
purpose of ornamenting the vocal presentation of the preaching monk, and
confer onhim thedhāraṇī. Iwill bring about his state of vocal facility in analy-
sis. I will fashion in that preaching monk a great light of knowledge. And
whatever words or letters will have been lost or forgotten from this Lord
King of Sūtras, this Suvarṇabhāsottama, I will refresh all of those well-
etymologized words and letters for that preaching monk, and I will confer
on him the dhāraṇī for the sake of retention of his recollection.
As in the case of the Bodhisattvas in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, there is a very
similar statement in the Suvarṇabhāsottama (pp. 112.8–113.13) from Śrī
Mahādevī that echoes many of the commissive vows taken by Sarasvatī. Such
vows also appear intermittently in other scriptures, some of which, like the
Sarvatathāgatādhisṭḥāna, express them through the agency of several worldly
divinities (§§ 69, 79, 85–6, etc.).
A distinctive position is occupied by the four Mahārājas in dhāraṇī literature,
an extension of their much earlier function as protectors of the Buddhist dispen-
sation. As they live in the four directions surrounding Mt. Sumeru, they would
appear to be a Buddhist iteration of the larger Indian fixation on the gods of the
directions (Wessels-Mevissen 2001). In this instance, the different Mahārājas
may take the vow to confer a dhāraṇī of protection on the dharmabhāṇaka or
other supporter in the future. As Virūḍhaka affirms:
aham api bhagavan dhāraṇīpadāni bhāsịsỵe bahujanahitāya tesạ̄ṃ ca
tathārūpāṇāṃ dharmabhāṇakānām evaṃrūpāṇāṃ sūtrāntadhārakāṇāṃ
raksạ̄varaṇaguptaye dhāraṇīmantrapadāni |
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka 399.7–9
I also, O Lord, will speak these dhāraṇī words, for the welfare of the
many, the dhāraṇī-mantra words for the protection, shelter and security
of the Dharma preachers as have been described, and for the bearers of
the sūtras as have been mentioned.
These statements by kings of demons – as the four Mahārājas are – are immediately
followed by a group commissive by eleven rāksạsī demonesses, from Lambā to
Hārītī, who reveal their (? collective)mantra so that the dharmabhāṇakaswill be pro-
tected from a lengthymenu of demons and nasty spirits, who apparently live to harass
preachers (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka pp. 400–02). Nor is this the only place where the
four Mahārājas commit to the protection of those invested in dhāraṇī scriptures,
for we see much more lengthy statements in the Suvarṇabhāsottama and the
Mahāsāhasraparmardanī, both of which feature the four great protector kings.
In pragmatic terms, the explicature (explicit message) in almost all such com-
missives is not simply that the figures involved will broadly support anyone
reciting the dhāraṇī scriptures, but that they each come equipped with their
own powerful spells which they reveal in the course of the commissive state-
ment. These mantras they promise to reveal or to employ again at a later
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time, usually if the conditions of their support are fulfilled by the
dharmabhāṇakas maintaining the dhāraṇī scripture. The implicature (implied
message) of many such texts is that the great Bodhisattvas, the worldly gods
and the local spirits are all conspirators in the spread of the Buddhist message.23
Their explicit commitment comes with the implicit understanding that the
preachers are more generally favoured in the hierarchy of Indian religious
agents. Because they are the specific cause for the spread and maintenance of
the Mahāyānist dhāraṇī tradition, the dharmabhāṇakas also spread the material
and intellectual goods that dhāraṇīs confer, detailed extensively throughout the
literature. The support of these men by the worldly gods is thus implicitly cir-
cular: because the dharmabhāṇakas spread the means for the further production
of health and wealth, the gods, spirits and others may all be granted greater offer-
ings by dharmabhāṇaka followers, further motivating their support.
D. Dhāraṇī precedent and predictive assertives
The previous assertives, directives and commissives have as their purpose the
legitimization of the use of mantra-dhāraṇīs, with minimal and maximal implied
goals, both of which extend from the directive statements. The minimal perlocu-
tionary (affective reception) goal was that the current formulator/user of the
mantra-dhāraṇī would be understood as acting in a legitimate manner within
the Buddhist world and not acting in an illegitimate manner. In my previous
study (Davidson 2009: 115–16) I cited a section in Māhīśāsaka-vinaya in
which monks reciting “Namo bhagavan!” doubted whether this was legitimate.
Thus the minimal implication is authority of expression and reassurance in
which the directive statement (“take up, Ānanda”) could be relocated – as some-
times observed in the use of religious texts – out of context and understood to
apply to readers or to listeners in real time, who would be expected to replace
Ānanda or whomever as the object of the direct address with their imagined
selves projected into the narrative. In distinction, the maximal perlocutionary
goal would to be persuasive: to increase that use and application of
mantra-dhāraṇīs by spreading the message to new populations and across
Indian language systems.
Notwithstanding these goals, there were clear inhibitions to this process. One
is the problem of felicity conditions. Austin (1962: 26–47) indicated that speech
acts misfire in the face of faulty felicity conditions. Most of the felicity con-
ditions have to do with the speaker (in our case the author) and the participants:
A. There must be a procedure and the speaker must be authorized, B. the par-
ticipants must perform the act correctly and completely, and Г. the participants
are sincere in the performance and conduct themselves appropriately afterwards.
Austin was not entirely clear on the difference between this latter felicity con-
dition and the kinds of perlocutionary goals that would extend from a successful
performance (Levinson 1983: 236–46), but for our purposes one of the constitu-
ents of sincerity would be that somehow the mantra-dhāraṇīs be designated the
word of the/a Buddha.
23 On implicature, see Carston 2004, Horn 2004, Levinson 1983.
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To this end, dhāraṇī or Mahāyāna hrḍaya framing statements may contain an
assertion of the previous pronouncement or use of the mantra-dhāraṇī by
Buddhas or Bodhisattvas in the past. This material may be placed in the intro-
ductory section associated with the directive illocutionary force, or alternatively
it may be located in a concluding statement following the mantra-dhāraṇī, or be
absent altogether. When present, the specification of the previous pronounce-
ment of the mantra-dhāraṇī by one or more Buddhas in the past reiterates an
important trope in Buddhist literature, similar in many regards to Indian litera-
ture in general. Because the overall trope is entirely mythological, it has
occasionally been set aside in the past by scholars seeking “historical” sub-
stance. But whether it comes before or after the actual pronouncement of the
mantra-dhāraṇī, the trope establishes not history but precedent, an important
attribute in a society gravely concerned with legal technicalities.
In this process, the inauguration of a new behaviour is caught in the horns of
more than one dilemma. The first is that new behaviours, even if grudgingly
admitted as necessary, are understood to be disruptive. Again and again, the
social fabric of Buddhist India is depicted as potentially fragile, easily torn
and difficult to repair. While this is in part a legacy of caste, with its strategy
of dividing society as a vehicle of social control, it is equally a consequence
of the quickness with which Indians resort to accusations of flaws – real or ima-
gined – in their co-religionists, and the minuteness of the inspection of potential
infractions. Illustrations of this principle are strewn throughout the various
prātimoksạ rules of the Vinaya traditions, both in its prohibitions against false
accusation (e.g. saṃghāvaśesạdharmas 8–10) and in the various discussions
about whether an accusation under any of the rules is correct or not.
The second dilemma is equally compelling: the need for new rituals in accord
with the changing religious horizon of India even while actual Indian historical
record keeping is relatively meagre. Were Indians to rely on an archive of factual
precedents maintained in other legal or ritual writing (Greek, Roman, Chinese),
they might have selected analogies based on prior judgements to argue the val-
idity of new(er) ritual systems, or at least tied their mythological statements to a
hagiographical presentation of a historical person. To be sure, they did this in
selected instances, as in the case of Nāgārjuna and the retrieval of the
Prajñāpāramitā scriptures or the case of Asaṅga and the retrieval of the
Yogācārabhūmi. But human hagiographies became strongly de-emphasized in
the Mahāyāna discourse during the first several centuries CE for reasons still
obscure. Caught between the horns of the two dilemmas (lack of precedent
and ritual need), mythology – being the default mode of much of Indian civili-
zation – was placed in service to expound the utility of, and precedent for, a rite
newly brought into the Buddhist fold.
As an example of the form, we find the Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka introducing its pri-
mary dhāraṇī in the following manner:
udgrḥṇa tvaṁ kulaputremaṁ sarvajñātākāradhāraṇīmukhapraveśaṁ
sarvātītais tathāgatair arhadbhiḥ samyaksaṁbuddhair yauvarājyābhisịktānāṁ
bodhisattvānāṁ deśitaṁ | ye caitarhi daśasu diksụ sarvalokadhātusụ buddhā
bhagavantas tisṭḥanti dhriyante yāpayanti te ’pi buddho bhagavanto
yauvarājyābhisịktānāṁ bodhisattvānāṁ deśayanti, ye ’pi te bhavisỵanty
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anāgate ’dhvani buddhā bhagavantas te ’pi yauvarājyābhisịktānāṁ
bodhisattvānām imaṁ sarvajñatākāradhāraṇīmukhapraveśaṁ deśayisỵanti |
Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka 21.5–1624
You should, O son of good family, take up this entrance into the means of the
dhāraṇī of omniscience, which was preached by all the Arhats, the Tathāgatas
of the past to Bodhisattvas consecrated as princes [i.e. tenth bhūmi
Bodhisattvas]. And [it] is nourished and upheld by those lord Buddhas residing
at present in all theworld systems in the ten directions; the lordBuddhas preach it
to theBodhisattvas consecrated as princes.And the lordBuddhaswhowill reside
in the future, will preach to theBodhisattvas consecrated as princes thismeans of
the dhāraṇī of omniscience.
Here the precedent statement is part of the noun phrase following the directive,
with its imperative verb. The nature of the dhāraṇī entrance is qualified by the
lengthy assertive statement of its continually being part of the preaching of
the Buddhas of the past, present and future. Elsewhere, we find phrases like
“these dhāraṇī words, O Lord, have been pronounced and approved by the
Tathāgatas, the Arhats, the Samyaksambuddhas, as many as are equal to
the grains of sand in the river Ganges” (imāni bhagavan dhāraṇīpadāni
ganġānadīvālikāsamais tathāgatair arhadbhiḥ samyaksaṁbuddhair bhāsịtāni,
anumoditāni ca) come after the mantra-dhāraṇīs in the three instances in
which it is invoked in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra (pp. 397.2–3, 398.5–6,
400.1–2). Yet many of the lengthy dhāraṇī texts surviving, as well as their trans-
lations into Chinese or Tibetan, include such affirmations in an introductory sec-
tion, prior to the mantra-dhāraṇī pronouncement.
In this, they continue an older form, that unites some of the tangents of the
Jātakas, the Avadānas, or other spell literature (hrḍaya, vidyā), which employ
many of the same precedent forms. As the early Matanġī-sūtra section of the
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna affirms:
iyam ānanda sạḍaksạrī vidyā sạḍbhiḥ samyaksaṃbuddhair bhāsịtā
caturbhiś ca mahārājaiḥ śakreṇa devānām indreṇa brahmaṇā ca
sahāpatinā | mayā caitarhi śākyamuninā samyaksaṃbuddhena bhāsịtā|
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna 4.19–21
This six-syllable spell was preached by six Samyaksambuddhas, and by
the four Great Kings, and to the gods by Śakra-Indra and by
Brahma-Sahāpati. And here it is being pronounced by me, Śākyamuni
Samyaksambuddha.
Consequently, the affirmation that it has been preached by six previous Buddhas
aligns the mythology of the spell with the cult of the seven Buddhas, which is
evinced in archaeological sites and was a fertile ground for the production of
24 Yamada’s printed text p. 21.8 has sarvātītānāgatais, but this violates the sense and con-
trast between deśitam and deśayisỵanti, and is not supported in the various translations:
T.157.3.169b28–9: 過去諸多陀阿伽度阿羅呵三藐三佛陀, T.158.3.3.235c28: 一切過
去如來應供正遍知; To. 112, mdo-sde cha, fol. 136a6–7: ’di ni ’das pa’i de bzhin
gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas thams cad kyis . . ..
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mantra-dhāraṇīs.25 The Matanġī-sūtra provides an early affirmation of the alli-
ance of these figures and spell literature, but later each of the Buddhas
(Vipaśyin, etc.) will be provided independent mantra-dhāraṇīs, both in collected
texts and in autonomous works (Davidson forthcoming).
Some of these mythological frames provide their mantra-dhāraṇīs with an
extensive pedigree, as in the case of the sixth-century Ekādaśamukha, in
which Avalokiteśvara describes his previous practice (pūrvayoga) as the king
of sorcerers who were great rṣịs (maharsịvidyādhararāja) at the time of the
Buddha Śatapadmanayana-cūḍāpratihata-saṃgavelāma-raśmirāja, from whom
he received this teaching, which has fourteen benefits.26 At another time he
was king of the rṣịvidyādharas devoted to the Buddha Mandāravagandha-
tathāgata, from whom Avalokiteśvara also received this teaching. That story is
dwarfed by the later Mahāpratisarā-dhāraṇī narrative, which is extraordinarily
lengthy and baroque, and occupies much of the text.
Pragmatically, there are two directions indicated by such affirmations: first
they facilitate an accommodation to the common ground for presuppositions
about the nature of the mantra-dhāraṇīs; and second, they place the
mantra-dhāraṇī in an imagined narrative that allows the reciter to participate
in the word of the Buddha (Roberts 2004: 199). By the first of these, I mean
that the text asserts the validity of a specific mantra-dhāraṇī, but this presup-
poses that mantra-dhāraṇīs in general have been and may be understood to con-
stitute the pronouncement of a/the/many/all Buddhas in the past. Thus, the
particular element (mantra-dhāraṇī, vidyā, hrḍaya) will take its place among
other dhāraṇīs that are understood to be categories of known revelations.
Many problems attend this assumption, however, because none of these
elements have an assured position in the architecture of the word of the Buddha.
As is well known, the categories of approved revelation include the various
elements in the Tripitạka, generally understood as being classified into the
twelve branches (dvādaśānġa) of the literature that informs Mahāyāna scriptural
discussions: discourses (sūtra), chanted elements (geya), prophecies
(vyākaraṇa), verses (gāthā), ebullient expressions (udāna), responses
(nidāna), exemplary narratives (avadāna), disciples’ narratives (itivrṭtaka), pre-
vious birth stories ( jātaka), extensive scriptures (vaipulya), miraculous teach-
ings (adbhutadharma) and incontrovertible exegesis (upadeśa).27 However,
neither mantra-dhāraṇīs nor other kinds of mantric expressions (vidyā, mantra,
hrḍaya) find a convenient place in any of the categories, even those – as in the
twelve-branch system’s “extensive scripture” (vaipulya) – that are sometimes
employed to justify the composition and inclusion of the Mahāyāna scriptures
25 E.g., found in Ajanta, Burgess 1881, painted inscription nos. 17, 30; Cohen (2006)
inscriptions 58, 70, 90 and 91. Found in Barhut, Lüders 1963, B13, B14, B15, B16,
B17. Found in Sāñchī, Marshall and Foucher 1940, vol. 1 no. 834. I have reviewed
this material in detail in Davidson forthcoming.
26 Dutt incorrectly rendered this name; cf. Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts vol. 2, fol. 2422.4.
This name also appears in the Shatial inscriptions; von Hinüber 1989, nos. 91a, 91d;
Fussman and König 1997, nos. 5:8, 170:5; I thank the anonymous reviewer for directing
my attention to the correct name.
27 Abhidharmasamuccaya p. 78; Abhidharmasamuccayabhāsỵa pp. 95–6. Lamotte (1958:
143–91) discusses the traditional scriptural assignments; also Davidson forthcoming.
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overall. Moreover, the standards of scriptural authenticity that have been used
since the time of the old Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to admit new scriptures –
they descend through the sūtras, are reflected in the vinaya and should not con-
tradict reality (sūtre ’vataranti vinaye saṃdrṣ́yante dharmatāñ ca na vilo-
mayanti) – appear to exclude the admission of such forms of spells as an
independent category.28 These categories of scriptural classification and vali-
dation are our best understanding of the shared assumptions that would consti-
tute the pragmatic common ground.
When an assertion, however, violates the common-ground suppositions, it will
either require a minor adjustment (accommodation) in the presupposition (van
Fintel 2008) or be rejected with a failure of perlocutionary effect. Given the con-
troversial nature of dhāraṇīs at an early stage, it is probable that some in the com-
munity reacted with the “Hey wait a minute!” response, which Shanon and van
Fintel indicate is a marker of the violation of suppositions that cannot be smoothly
accommodated.29 Verification of spells’ challenge to received understanding is
visible in two aspects of the scriptures.30 First, in scriptures that introduce spells,
there is often – as in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka citation above – a specific identi-
fication that the mantra-dhāraṇī or vidyā was pronounced by some/a/the Buddha.
This is pleonastic given that the entire scripture was to be so understood as bud-
dhavacana, but most often only the spell elements are so specially marked in the
text. Second, we find that the narrative of precedent is occasionally, as in
the Bhaisạjyavastu, given a secondary section to address doubt in the minds of
the monks. This is an effective trope employed more broadly within that
Vinaya to reinforce lessons of karma, generally in the case of extraordinary events
that may be explained by past actions; but here it has been turned to the pro-
nouncement of the mantra in order to aid its uptake.
bhiksạvaḥ saṃśayajātāḥ sarvasaṃśayacchettāraṃ buddhaṃ bhagavantaṃ
papracchuḥ | āścaryaṃ bhagavan yāvac ca bhagavatā mahāmāyūrī vidyā
upakarā bahukarā ca | na bhiksạva etarhi yathā mamātīte ’py adhvany
aksạṇapratipannasya vinipatitaśarīrasyāpi mahāmāyūrī vidyārājā
upakarā bahukarā ca | tac chrūyatām |
Bhaisạjyavastu 287.11–1531
28 Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra §24. On these issues, see Lamotte 1949, Davidson 1990.
29 This kind of response is discussed in Shanon 1976 and van Fintel 2004; however, this is
itself not uncontroversial and Atlas (2004) articulates a very different theoretical struc-
ture, based on neo-Gricean mechanisms of inference. Theoretical modelling aside, for
our purposes the response to assertions contradicting assumptions would be expected
to be similar.
30 In the śāstras, we also find objections to mantra-dhāraṇīs and their differing refutations;
see Tarkajvālā, Eckel, pp. 179–82, 359–62; and Eltschinger 2008 for Dharmakīrti.
31 The Tibetan is a bit peculiar (To. 1, ‘dul-ba, vol. ga, fol. 49b3): dge slong rnams the tshom
skyes nas the tshom thams cad gcod pa sangs rgyas bcom ldan ’das la zhus pa| bcom ldan
’das ji tsam du bcom ldan ’das kyis rma bya chen mo’i rigs sngags sman pa dang| gces
spras bgyid pa ngo mtshar che lags so| |dge slong dag da ltar ’ba’ zhig tu ma yin te| ji
ltar ’das pa’i dus na yang nga log par ltung ba’i lus mi khom par gyur pa na rig sngags
kyi rgyal mo rma bya chen mos phan pa dang gces spras byas pa de nyon cig | The
sDe-dge at least has sman-pa for the first instance of upakara and phan-pa for the second.
P R A G M A T I C S O F D H Ā R A Ṇ Ī S 27
Then (after hearing the vidyā and its benefits and being directed to its reci-
tation) all the monks became doubtful. In order to relieve themselves of
doubt, they asked the Lord Buddha, “Magnificent, Lord, that the Great
Peacock Spell should be beneficial and esteemed even by the Lord!”
“O monks, not just here in this life, but also in a past existence was this
Great Peacock Spell beneficial and esteemed, when I had fallen into
an untimely existence, my body under threat. So listen to this narrative”.
If the affirmation of mantra-dhāraṇīs as buddhavacana is found preceding the
mantra-dhāraṇī, then it most often works in conjunction with the directive strat-
egies to provide pragmatic force to them that they would not otherwise receive.
If the affirmation comes after the mantra-dhāraṇī, then it tends to work with
statements of the supernatural benefits of the mantra-dhāraṇī. Most interest-
ingly, there are many instances in which this is not explicit, and we may presume
the spells were communicated in less contentious environments.
E. Benefit assertives
There are too many benefit statements to begin to do justice to the wealth of
hyperbolic claims made by the dhāraṇī authors for their spells and the rituals
surrounding them. The vast majority relate to relieving an individual from
fear, anxiety, and the spectrum of vagaries of life in South Asia: lack of food,
water, capricious political figures, disease, animals, insects and noxious spirits.
Perhaps because of the predisposition of Mahāyāna scriptures to grandiosity, the
benefit claims for spells far exceeded the problem that precipitated the pro-
nouncement of the dhāraṇī or vidyā in the first place.
In the Mahāmāyūrī, for example (as also in the Bhaisạjyavastu material pre-
sented in section A above), the precipitating narrative was the imminent death,
by snakebite, of the hapless monk Svāti. Once the Buddha pronounces the Great
Peacock Spell, however, he goes on to articulate a broad swath of potential
benefits that are not limited to medical emergencies.
na cāsya rājabhayaṃ bhavisỵati | na caurabhayaṃ bhavisỵati |
nāgnibhayaṃ bhavisỵati | nodakena kālaṃ karisỵati | na cāsya kāye visạṃ
kramisỵati | na śastraṃ kramisỵati | sukhaṃ ciraṃ jīvisỵati | sthāpayitvā
ānanda paurāṇāṃ [karmavipākam] svapnāṃ sukhaṃ ca prativibudhisỵati |
svastho nirupadravo niruttrāso nihatapratyarthiko nihatapratyamitro
nirupahataḥ sarvavisạbhayavinirmuktaḥ sukhaṃ ciraṃ jīvisỵati |
sthāpayitvā ānanda paurāṇaṃ karmavipākaṃ|
Mahāmāyūrī 58.20–59.6
[For one reciting this Great Peacock Spell], there will be no fear of kings’
[capricious punishment], no fear of thieves or of fire, or of death by drown-
ing. Nor will poison afflict his body, nor weapons, and he will live long
and prosper, only excepting the results of prior karma. And he will
awake happy from dreams. He will be content, not experience catastrophe,
lead a life lacking terror, his enemies destroyed, his opponents ruined,
himself untouched, freed from fear of any poison, living long and prosper-
ously, only excepting the results of prior karma.
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Similarly the “six-syllable” spell given in the Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna was articu-
lated in response to Ānanda’s being controlled by an outcast witch, although
Ānanda was freed from the witch’s spell by a different mantra. No matter –
the benefits of the second spell apparently far exceed those of the one the
Buddha is depicted as actually employing.
yaḥ kaścid ānanda sạḍaksạryā vidyayā paritrāṇaṃ svastyayanaṃ kuryāt
sa yadi vadhārho bhavet daṇḍena mucyate | daṇḍārhaḥ prahāreṇa
prahārārhaḥ paribhāsạṇayā paribhāsạṇārho romaharsẹṇa
romaharsạṇārhaḥ punar eva mucyate |
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna 5.5–7
Whoever, O Ānanda, would create protection and prosperity [himself] with
this six-syllable spell, even if he were to be worthy of death, he would be
released with [merely] a [prison] sentence; one worthy of a sentence would
get a beating; one worthy of a beating would get a scolding; one worthy of
a scolding would be released with his hair happily horripilating; and one
worthy of happy horripilation would actually be liberated.
In most such instances, we find an extensive discussion of all possible advan-
tages. Even more astonishing, by the medieval period every sort of moral degra-
dation that Buddhists had specified as utterly irredeemable and normally
resulting in immediate retribution could now be eliminated from the individual
by merely reciting the appropriate mantra-dhāraṇī, truly a sea-change in
Buddhist ritual response.32 Consequently, the Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka could affirm:
bhāvayamānaś ca bodhisattvo mahāsattva imaṃ
sarvajñatākāradhāraṇīmukhapraveśaṃ | yadi tasya bodhisattvasya
pañcānantaryāṇi karmāṇi krṭāni syur upacitāni tāny apy asya pariksạyaṃ
gacchanti |
Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka 29–7
And for a bodhisattva mahāsattva cultivating this entrance in the means of
the dhāraṇī of omniscience, even if that bodhisattva may have performed
and accumulated the five sins of immediate retribution, for him even those
are destroyed.
This did not sit well with some authors, to be sure, and the Ratnaketuparivarta
reserves these five from the action of such remarkable practices,
sthāpyānantaryakāriṇaṃ saddharmapratiksẹpakaṃ vā āryāpavādakaṁ
vā | yad anyat kāyavānṁanaḥphalavipākadausṭḥulyaṁ tat sarvaṁ pari-
ksạyaṁ yāsyati |
Ratnaketuparivarta p. 151.2–4
Setting aside only the sins of immediate retribution, the rejection of the
true Dharma, or disparagement of the saints, any other defilements matur-
ing from results of body speech and mind, are all destroyed.
32 On the five sins (ānantaryakarma), with their attendant problems of definition, appli-
cation and ideology, see the good survey in Silk 2007.
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But this difference of opinion was set forth in all kinds of places, including in the
rendering of the above idea – stated several times throughout the
Ratnaketuparivata – in its Chinese translations. Dharmaksẹma’s earlier trans-
lation (414–426 CE) specifically maintained that these five sins are able to be
destroyed (T.397(9).13.150b4: 即能令滅除五逆罪), whereas the same state-
ment in Prabhāmitra’s later (627–30 CE) translation is in accord with the
Gilgit text (T.402.13.575c6: 唯置作五逆者誹謗正法者謗無賢聖者) and the
Tibetan: the sins of immediate retribution cannot be so remediated (To.138,
fol. 262a5–6: mtshams med pa byed pa dang | dam pa’i chos spong ba
dang | ’phags pa la skur pa ’debs pa ma togs par gang gzhan lus dan ngag
dang | yid kyi ’bras bu rnam par smin pa’i gnas ngan len de thams cad
yongs su byang bar ’gyur ro |)
Nonetheless, eventually the whole range of mantra-dhāraṇī benefits appears
to have been accepted. As the list of potential transgressions became longer with
increased ritualization in India – and the potential for ritual violations – so did
the release from those sins that could be afforded by the maintenance, recitation
and transmission of the mantra-dhāraṇīs, even with a single recitation.
evaṃ mahardhiko ’yaṃ mama bhagavan [hrḍayam] ekavelāṃ prakāśitvā
catvāro mūlāpattayaḥ ksạ[yaṃ] gacchanti pañcānantaryāṇi karmāṇi nir-
avayavaṃ tanvīkarisỵanti |
Ekādaśamukhahrḍaya-dhāraṇī 38.5–733
Thus having recited just once this my miraculous “essential” spell, all of
the four fundamental transgressions are reduced to nothing, and even the
five sins of immediate retribution are indivisibly diminished.
The Ekādaśamukhahrḍaya-dhāraṇī continues, by identifying a cornucopia of
benefits, with virtually no item omitted from the list, but even earlier a specifically
soteriological statement highlights the manner in which benefits became extended:
yaḥ kaścit kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā imāṃ sạṇmukhī-nāma-dhāraṇīṃ
trisḳrṭvā rātres trisḳrṭvā divasya cānuvar(t)tayisỵati sa sarva-karmāṇi
ksẹpayitvā ksịpram anuttarāṃ samyak-sambodhim abhisambhotsyate ‖
Ṣaṇmukhīdhāraṇī 10.
Whatever son or daughter of good family should thrice perform this
Ṣaṇmukhīdhāraṇī at night, and during the day, and follow its instruction,
having destroyed all the hindrance of karma, he will quickly awaken to
highest supreme awakening.
Eventually, this cascade of potential benefits to reciting a mantra-dhāraṇī, with
its uneasy relationship between worldly and religious priorities, will become
codified in finite lists, such as the twenty rewards (viṃśatir anuśaṃsāḥ) and
33 Ekādaśamukhahrḍaya-dhāraṇī p. 38.5–7; To. 694, fol. 140a7: bcom ldan ’das bdag gi
rig sngags ’di’i gzi byin chen po’i mthu dang ldan pas | gang la la gzhig gis lan cig
tsam bzlas brjod bgyis pa na yang rtsa ba’i ltung ba bzhi dang | mtshams ma mchis
pa lnga ma lus par yongs su ’byang bar ’gyur na |; T.1070.20.149c5–7.
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the eight other elements obtained (aparān asṭạu dharmmān pratilapsyante),
found in the Amoghapāśa-hrḍaya (Amoghapāśahrḍaya-dhāraṇī 317–18).
F. Warning assertive hybrids
Throughout the text of the dhāraṇīs we find various assertive warnings to those
not compliant with the injunctions of the dhāraṇī, be they various demons or per-
sons unimpressed by the dhāranī’s revelation. It would appear that, initially, the
statements predicted that dire consequence would be automatic, as in the case
of the gāthā at the conclusion of the dhāraṇī chapter in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka:
saptadhāsya sphutẹn mūrdhā arjakasyeva mañjarī |
ya imaṁ mantra śrutvā vai atikramed dharmabhāṇakam ‖ XXI.1‖
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka 402.4–5.
Whoever, having listened to this mantra, should still transgress against the
dharmabhāṇaka, may his head split into seven parts, like the blossom
cluster of the arjaka.
This is a relatively old trope in Indian literature, that an opponent in a contest
of speech or transgressor against a religious system will be cursed with an explod-
ing cranium, often because that person is incapable of answering a question. Its
early phraseology (mūrdhā te viparisỵati) goes back at least as far as
the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (14.6.7, 14.6.8) and the older Upanisạds (e.g.
Brḥadāraṇyaka 3.7.1, 3.9.26; Chāndogya 1.8.6, 1.8.8), and the relationship
between those and the specifically Buddhist form indicates that it was widely
understood to be the potential consequence of an oral contest, eventually taken
into the literary vocabulary at an early period (Witzel 1987: 408–9). Dhāraṇī
texts generally asserted the consequence of transgression to be the head bursting
into seven parts, like the pod or blossom of the arjaka (a species of basil, perhaps
ocimum grassimum or ocimum album closely related to the tulasi and well known
in medical literature). The plant sends out a cluster of pods at each joint that is
quite dramatic and apparently served as the basis for the metaphor.
The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka articulates the older form of the trope – as seen in
much late Vedic and early Buddhist literature – that the consequences will be
automatic without personal or divine intervention; thus the sentence is a
modal assertive articulating a potential, for it does not personally invoke the
action, if the Buddha or other figure had issued a specific threat. A stronger
modal warning, seen in other dhāraṇī literature, makes the future head-splitting
the result of the intervention of the full panoply of Buddhist spirits and protec-
tive beings, whose threat and weapons are invoked as warnings to those who
consider such transgressions. This form echoes earlier warning narratives
found in the Dīghanikāya and the brāhmaṇas, wherein a god or supernatural
being (Soma, Indra, Vajrapāṇi, etc.) exercises judgemental functions in the
case of criminal behaviour or ritual violation (Insler 1989–90).
The Mahāmāyūrī’s statement is a standard example of the type, not the short-
est but by no means the longest expression. After a rather lengthy identification
of all the beings and elements who should not transgress against the power of the
vidyā, the text issues the appropriate warning:
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yaś cemām ānanda mahāmāyūrīvidyārājñīm atikramet tasya vajrapāṇiḥ
saptadhā mūrdhānam arjakasyeva mañjarīṃ sphotạyisỵati | sarvabuddha-
bodhisatva-pratyekabuddhaśrāvakānāṃ tejasā nasṭạ āloko nasṭạś
cetasaḥ | āryapudgalās tena visaṃvāditā bhaveyuḥ | catvāraś cainaṃ
mahārājānaḥ ksụraparyantaiḥ śastrair mahāntaṃ vyasanam āpādayeyuḥ |
śakraś cāsya devānām indras tridaśagaṇaparivrṭo vajreṇa mūrdhānam
abhibhindyāt | brahmatejasā cāsya vibhūtir bhasmaṃ gacchet |
Mahāmāyūrī 58.12–1734
Andwhoever,OĀnanda,might transgress against theGreat PeacockSpell, the
Queen of Spells, Vajrapāṇi will break his head into seven parts, like the blos-
som cluster of an arjaka. And with the majesty of all the Buddhas,
Bodhisattvas, Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas, his light and mind will be
destroyed. That is what would be the case for one who has deceived the
noble beings. And the four Great Kings would visit enormous calamity on
him with their weapons, edges sharp as razors. And Śakra, the Indra of the
gods, surrounded by his retinue of [gods of the] thirty[-three], would split
his headwith his vajra, andby themajesty ofBrahma, hiswealthwill be turned
into ashes.
Similar statements are found elsewhere, as in the Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī, but it
seems entirely directed to spirits possessing the individual:
yo graho na muñcet saptadhāsya sphutẹn mūrdhā arjakasyeva mañjarī |
vajrapāṇiś cāsya mahāyaksạsenāpatir vajreṇādīptena prajvālitena eka-
jvālībhūtena tāvad vyāyacched yāvan mūrdhānaṃ sphotạyet | catvāraś
ca mahārājāno ’yomayena cakreṇa mūrdhānaṃ sphotạyeyuḥ |
ksụradhārāprahāreṇa vināśyeyus tasmāc ca yaksạlokā(c) cyavanaṃ bha-
veyuḥ | aḍakavatyāṃ rājadhānyāṃ na labhate vāsam |
Mahāśītāvatī-dhāraṇī 5.8–1535
Which ever seizer would not release [the person], his head would split in
seven like the blossom cluster of an arjaka. And Vajrapāṇi the Great
General of Yaksạs will take his flaming, glowing vajra, and in a single
flaming mass, would fight that possessing spirit, until his head exploded.
And the four Great Kings would split his head with their iron cakras, so
that they would destroy him as if with the stroke of a razor’s edge, causing
him to die and leave the realm of the yaksạs. Then he would never obtain
residence in the capital city, Aḍakavatī.
Here the commentary ascribed to Karmavajra clarifies that Vaiśravaṇa gathers
together in his residence of Aḍakavatī all the protective spirits – the thirty-two
Mahābalas, the twenty-eight Senāpatis, etc. – and that the spirits who had
34 Mahāmāyūrī p. 58.12–17; To. 559, fol. 115b2–4; see also p. 12.15–17, 14.10–11, 57.8–
58.11. Here, we may note that the sDe-dge is corrupted beyond hope, and the sTog
Palace ms. is much the more correct, no. 518, vol. 103, fol. 513b2–5; instead of the
Sanskrit “tridaśa”, the translation reads trayastriṃśa – the heaven of the thirty-three, sup-
ported by the Tibetan sum bcu rtsa gsum pa’i tshogs kyis bskor.
35 Mahāśītāvatī-dhāraṇī To. 606, rgyud ba, fol. 38b5–7; gnod sbyin gyi ’jig rten de nas shi
’phos nas.
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transgressed the Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī would be barred from obtaining that hea-
venly position.36
While it is uncertain whether any of these threats are associated with the modern
parasomnia medical condition of exploding head syndrome, it is clear that the
admonitionwould have been taken seriously, since the headwas considered the resi-
dence of semen in Indianmedical physiology. Consequently, the threat was asmuch
a spectre of emasculation as of death.37 The introduction of the agency of the
Buddhist personages, as well as the activity of the guardian spirits, meant that,
from the Gupta period onwards, Buddhist literature was being influenced by a
tide of increasingly important theism. In this more pronounced theistic world, the
threat of divinely ordained retribution served the purpose of authenticating the pro-
clamation of the dhāraṇī as the speech of the Buddha, not to be contested (or else).
Pragmatically, these statements are all assertive in form, but serve a directive
function with declarative dimensions as well; consequently they are assertive
hybrids acting as indirect directives and declaratives (Archer 2010). As modal
warnings or veiled threats, they direct the listener/reader to understand that
those in defiance of the pronouncement will receive their just desserts. Their
declarative overtones extend from the employment of threats in dedications
from the time of the “schism edict” of Aśoka (Tieken 2000). Threat statements
became a commonplace in both sacred and secular uses, especially notable in
dedicatory inscriptions where the threats of the incursion of sin – equal to the
five great sins – are found in such places as Kuḍā cave (Burgess 1881: 11)
and Sāñchī (Marshall and Foucher 1940 I: 341–2, nos. 396, 404), to mention
but a few such locales. These have some declarative force because they are exer-
cised at the completion of a specific building programme or property dedication
and rely on the institutional position of the pronouncer to be effective, but are
indirect in their pragmatic force (Clapp 2009). Nonetheless, they are still for-
mally assertives, and Searle had recognized that hybrid assertives would of
necessity be a special case to be considered (Searle 1979: 20, 30–57; Searle
and Vanderveken 1985: 180–82). Even then, the liminal nature of threats in
speech act theory continues to be a topic of discussion, as do the closely related
forms of promises (Salgueiro 2010).
G. Expressives in praise of the Buddha or Bodhisattvas
Calling attention to the ubiquitous expressives of praise, confession, amazement,
fear and so on in the dhāraṇī texts might seem a bit pleonastic, but nonetheless
they are a type of statement that occurs in virtually every one (see Appendix A).
Such expressives are most often encountered in one or more of three places: in
the initial homage (e.g. namo buddhāya), in the dialogue within the body of the
text, often after the revelation of a mantra-dhāraṇī, and within the specific man-
tra statements of themantra-dhāraṇīs. The former are sometimes questionable as to
whether they were the consequence of later scribes or manuscript owners, but the
second, the dialogical praises, are embedded in the dhāraṇī narrative exposition
and appear less contrived. So, after the revelation of a dhāraṇī by another agent,
36 Mahāśītavanavidyārājñīsūtraśatasahasratị̄kā fol. 331a4–6.
37 In modern stories of Rajasthan, the loss of the hero’s head does not deter his performance
in battle until he completes his heroic task; see Harlan 2003.
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frequently the Buddha approves with formalized expressions, “Well done, O
Bhaisạjyarāja, that you have, for the benefit of beings, expressed the words of this
dhāraṇī, performed their safety and protection, based on compassion for beings”.
(Saddharmapuṇḍarīka p. 397: sādhu sādhu bhaisạjyarāja sattvānām arthaḥ krṭo
dhāraṇīpadāni bhāsịtāni sattvānāmanukampāmupādāya raksạ̄varaṇaguptiḥ krṭā).
These expressives often blend with E, the assertives of benefits, and
occasionally C, commissive statements, so we find Brahmā’s expression that:
subhāsịtā iyaṃ vidyā mahāsāhasraparmardanī |
vidyām aham pravaksạ̄mi dārakānāṃ hitaṃkarī |
buddhavīraṃ namasyāmi dharmarājaṃ śubhākaraṃ‖
yena prathamato vidyā jaṃbudvīpe prakāśitā |
Mahāsāhasraparmardanī 35.3–6
This is well-expressed, this Mahāsāhasrapramardanī. I will proclaim this
spell, which benefits boys. Homage to the Buddha-Hero, the King of
Dharma, the source of benefit, by whom this spell was proclaimed to
this Jaṃbudvīpa
The weaving of all these together should not surprise us, and Searle has indicated
that various speech act environments may employ ritual statements in multiple
ways (Searle 1979: 28–9). Here the statement also echoes the old expressive
that, whatever the Buddha says, it is well-spoken (subhāsịta). Expressives of
homage are also frequently encoded into mantras, as will be shown below (I.i).
H. Narrative perlocutionary expressive or assertive statements
Even with evidence that dhāraṇīs’ status was not assured at the outset, some
texts emulate the larger Buddhist scriptural strategy of articulating a narrative
perlocutionary expressive – a first-person expression of the psychological or be-
havioural reception of the speech act. In this, the reader is not involved, but
rather the narrative receiver, sometimes a person or group who was not initially
favourable to the use of dhāraṇīs or spells but was later won over to the new
pronouncement. Such figures act as paradigms for the reader or hearer to under-
stand how to behave in light of the text’s message. This had also been a very old
trope in Buddhist texts. Often in the Pali tradition, and at least once in the
Āgamas, we find a revelation moment articulated, as in the case of the
Aggīka Bhāradvāja in the Vasalasutta section of the Suttanipāta.
abhikkantaṃ bho gotama abhikkantaṃ bho gotama seyyathāpi bho gotama
nikkujjitaṃ vā ukkujjeyya patịcchannaṃ vā vivareyya mūlḥassa vā maggaṃ
ācikkheyya andhakāre vā telapajjotaṃ dhāreyya cakkhumanto rūpāni
dakkhintīti evamevaṃ bhotāgotamenaanekapariyāyenadhammopakāsito |38
Hey, Gotama – excellent! Yeh, Gotama – excellent! I mean, Gotama, it’s like
something that’s inverted has been rectified, or something hidden has been
revealed. Or it’s like you’ve shown the road to someone lost, or brought an
oil lamp into a dark place, and those with vision can now see things that
38 Suttanipāta, vol. 1, p. 25.18–23; see also Samyuktāgama T. 99.2.77a20–29.
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were there all along. Just like that, by you Gotama, sir, in many ways you illu-
minate Dhamma!
Such perlocutionary narrative expressives tend to be the stock in trade of mis-
sionary religions, and the Buddhists employed them to affirm the value of the
message and to lead the reader into a receptive state of mind. Mahāyāna
sūtras, engaging a somewhat different vocabulary from that found in the Pali
texts, were nonetheless intent on much the same goal; it is specifically the
Mahāyāna version that most dhāraṇīs employed. Here the statement is that of
a third-person assertive rather than a first-person expressive.
idam avocad bhagavān | āttamanā āyusṃān ānanda āyusṃāṃś ca
svātir bhiksụr ye ca tasyāṃ parsạdi sannipatitāḥ sannisạṇṇāḥ
devanāgayaksạgandharvāsuragaruḍakinnara-mahoraga-yaksạ̄rāksạsa-
manusỵāmanusỵās te ca sarve bhagavato bhāsịtam abhyanandann iti |
Mahāmāyūrī 61.1–4
Thus the Lord explained. Then they were delighted, the Venerable
Ānanda, and the Venerable monk Svāti, and all those collected and seated
in that assembly – those gods, nāgas, yaksạs, gandharvas, asuras, gar-
uḍas, kinnaras, mahoragas, yaksạ̄s [sic], rāksạsas, human and non-
human – all of them were pleased to hear the Lord’s statement.
Similar reports of delight and enjoyment are found in formulaic perlocutionary
sentences in dhāraṇī literature, and they are simply replicating the overall struc-
ture and vocabulary of their Mahāyāna background.39
Conversely, for those not given to immediate expressions of joy with the pro-
nouncement of the mantra-dhāraṇī, the dhāraṇī scriptures sometimes describe
threatening or terrifying moments in the audience. As depicted in the
Mekhalā-dhāraṇī:
ye kecit pāpakarmāṇaḥ ojāhāra | prthivyā prativasaṃti | sa[rve te] mekhalā
vidyāṃ śrutvā saṃtrastā diśividiśi vrajaṃti |Mekhalā-dhāraṇī 156–740
39 Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī p. 6.7–9: idam avocat bhagavān āttamanā āyusṃān rāhulaḥ sā ca
sarvāvatī parsạt sadevamānusạ̄suragandharvaś ca loko bhagavataḥ
samyaksaṃbuddhabhāsịtam abhyanandann |. Ṣaṇmukhīdhāraṇī p. 10: idaṃ avocad
bhagavān āttamanās te ca bodhisa[t]tvā mahāsa[t]tvā bhagavato bhāsịtam abhyanandanann
iti ‖. Similar statements appear obligatory at the conclusion of Mahāyāna sūtras;
Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra pp. 250–51; Asṭạsāhasrikā p. 260.5–7; Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka-sūtra
p. 420.4–6; Saddharmapuṇḍarīka 487.1–5, etc.
40 Mekhalā-dhāraṇī pp. 156 (last line)–7; the section in [brackets] is reconstructed from the
Tibetan, 106b7–107a1: gang su dag sdig pa’i las dang ldan pa gzi byin ’phrog pas la
gnas pa de dag thams cad me kha la’i rig sngags thos nas shin tu skrag ste phyogs dang
phyogs mtshams su ’gro’i |; similarly T.1377.21.899b9–11: 大地所有大惡難調攝人威
光者極惡業者。若方若隅乃至一切處。聞是寶帶大明時皆大驚怖. We note that the
rendering of ojohāra is explained in both instances as stealing beings’ glory, taking ojas
as something like brilliance rather than vitality. We have a similar statement in
Ratnaketuparivarta p. 171.12–14: samanantarabhāsịtā cātạvakena mahāyaksạsenāpatinā
imāni mantrapadāny atha tāvad eva sarve devanāgayaksạkatạpūtanāḥ ksụbdhās trastā iha
sakale buddhaksẹtre ksịtigaganasthāḥ pracakaṃpire |.
P R A G M A T I C S O F D H Ā R A Ṇ Ī S 35
And all those sinful beings feasting on [beings’] vitality and living in the
ground, if they hear this Mekhalā-vidyā, then they become terrified and flee
in all the various directions.
The theme of terror of the pronouncement occurs elsewhere, sometimes with a
twist. In the Mahāsāhasrapramardanī, for example, the four kings express their
mantras with great hubris. In reply, the Buddha utters his own mantra that ter-
rifies the guardians of the directions, who all bow towards him (buddhasya
vacanaṃ śrutvā lokapālāś caturdiśam | uttrastā bhītasaṃvighnā asthāsuḥ
prāñjalīkrṭāḥ ‖ Mahāsāhasrapramardanī, p. 6.29–30).
However, Buddhist scriptures have been sensitive to portray their audience
reception as overwhelmingly positive. The mantra-dhāraṇī brings joy and hap-
piness to their lives, as it provides so many benefits, and the successful healing,
or demon quelling or positive conclusion to whatever event precipitated the pro-
nouncement of the dhāraṇī in the first place is treated as entirely benign. Yet
those receiving the dhāraṇī pronouncement with a negative attitude – as
many must have done – are cast in a similarly negative light: they may be power-
ful but ultimately it is their fear of the power of the Buddha or anxiety at the loss
of control that is driving their urge to escape from the radius of the dhāraṇī’s
pronunciation.
All told, we might acknowledge that dhāraṇī perlocutionary expressives and
assertives are deceptively sophisticated. They operate as a narrative of closure to
the teaching of the spell, so that it will be understood as not threatening to those
who will listen. Indian Buddhist audiences within such narratives are led from
consternation and confusion to affirmation of their understanding of the
Buddha (now shifted somewhat) and joy in his compassion. The scriptural state-
ments represent two possible understandings of the text – positive and negative –
and in doing so they control the message of its possible reception. Indian
audiences outside of the text, hearing a dhāraṇī narrative for the first time,
will be instructed by example to follow the correct reception of the spell, for
that is the pattern already established by the principal characters inscribed in
the narrative. The textual authors adroitly mimic prior Buddhist perlocutionary
formulae, which becomes every bit as important as the opening phrase, “Thus
have I heard”, by its simple ubiquity.
I. Mantra-dhāraṇīs as directives with complex coding
The mantras that almost invariably constituted the heart of the dhāraṇī texts are
so complex and so promiscuously produced with such variation in length and
components that it is difficult to envision a sufficient or all-encompassing cat-
alogue of traits. A beginning might be attempted, however, and in my esti-
mation there are four fundamental parts to many of the mantra-dhāraṇīs: i)
natural language sentences, or phrases, including both noun and verb phrases;
ii) discourse markers representing the grammaticalization of various previous
Indic language parts of speech; iii) the non-referential and non-lexical vocal
elements that operate both as echoes of other parts of speech (especially
imperative verbal endings) and as speech elements that appear designed to
interrupt linguistic construction; and iv) assertives of mantras as statements
of truth.
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I.i. Mantra-Dhāraṇīs as natural language
Part of the reason for the relatively quick dismissal of the assessment that man-
tras are categorically meaningless (based on a truth-conditional model) is that
some mantras or vidyās, particularly the early ones, are entirely natural language
expressions, but this is not very well recognized. An example from the
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna may be offered. This is the vidyā the Buddha is depicted
as reciting to counteract the spell of the witch capturing Ānanda:
sthitir acyutiḥ sunītiḥ | svasti sarvaprāṇibhyaḥ |
saraḥ prasannaṃ nirdosạṃ praśāntaṃ sarvato ’bhayaṃ |
ītayo yatra śāmyanti bhayāni calitāni ca |
tad vai devā namasyanti sarvasiddhāś ca yoginaḥ |
etena satyavākyena svasty ānandāya bhiksạve ‖
Stability, deathlessness, good conduct, benefit for all beings–
Water clear, faultless, peaceful and entirely fearless –
Where plagues, fears and mental disturbances are pacified –
[To] that indeed, all gods, siddhas and yogins pay homage.
With this statement of truth, [let there be] benefit to Ānanda, the monk.
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna 3.17–4.4
Despite the irregular grammar, the meaning is clear and in keeping with the early
Buddhist idea that nirvāṇa may be an object of appeal. And we are told that
Ānanda was immediately released from the witch’s spell and returned to his
own monastery without a problem.
When mantras are not entirely composed of natural language expressions,
then they still may have a component, whether a noun or verb phrase. In
Buddhist mantras, the noun phrase is sometimes one of homage to one or
more Buddhas. This form is not initially as well attested as other mantra
forms, but given that we see a similar homage used as a mantra in the
early-fifth-century translation of the Māhīśāsakavinaya, as noted before, it is
clear that such forms were found as early as the fourth century. Certainly we
see in the Mahāmāyūrī such lines as “Rain, O god, in all the ten directions!
Homage to the Buddhas! Svāhā (Mahāmāyūrī 7.19, 8.12: varsạtu devaḥ saman-
tena daśasu diśāsu | namo budhānāṃ svāhā |). Such homages to a/the Buddha(s)
begin almost every dhāraṇī in the collections of Buddhas’ names in the c.
fifth-century Central Asian manuscripts edited by Hoernle and von Hinüber, giv-
ing the name of one or another of the Buddhas found in various lists: namo
aksọbhyā[ya] tathāgatāya, namo amitābhāya tathāgatāya, etc.41 By the sixth
century it is common to find such statements as the Megha-sūtra’s “homage
to all Buddhas: bring to accomplishment the mantra’s words, Svāhā!”
(Megha-sūtra, p. 302: namaḥ sarvabuddhebhyaḥ sidhyantu mantrapadāni
svāhā) as definitely part of a dhāraṇī. As we see the movement into full tantric
41 Hoernle 1897: 231–2;VonHinüber 1987/88: 233; 1991: 166–70.VonHinüber (1987/88: 231–
2) has identified one of the texts as the Buddhanāmasahasrapañcaśatacaturtripañcasūtra, To.
262; T.443.
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literature these noun phrases, most often at the beginning of the mantra-dhāraṇī,
became increasingly important.
Other than noun phrases, the use of individual nouns or declined adjectives is
distributed throughout dhāraṇī literature. One needs only to examine words like
jvāle mahājvāle or agaṇe gaṇe gauri gandhāri caṇḍāli (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka
p. 398.4, 399.9) to understand that at least some of these are feminine singular
in the vocative case, and doubtless reflect the direct address to a goddess or
other feminine spirit at the village or popular level, taken into Buddhist
mantra-dhāraṇīs. Other forms may include specific Buddhist terms, not inte-
grated into a sentence and sometimes appearing as if on a list that may
have non-Buddhist nouns as well: dāntabhūmiḥ damathabhūmiḥ smrṭibhūmiḥ
prajñābhūmir vaiśāradyabhūmiḥ pratisaṃvidbhūmi anutksẹpabhūmiḥ
(Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka 43.13–5).
The verb phrases are evinced frequently, early and late. As Wayman (1985)
noted in the case of the tantras, such verbs are often second-person imperatives
and are sometimes repeated. Initially, the roots√bhū,√sat, and√sidh are seen
with some frequency: bhavatu, astu, sidhyantu. These are often connected with
nouns, but not always. We find such sensible statements as: “May there be
benefit for four-footed animals!” (Mahāmāyūrī p. 39.2: svasti bhavatu
catusp̣adānāṃ), but then forms like cekaratke aksạyam astu (May it be indes-
tructible!) ninile mamale appear with the verb between non-lexical vocalizations
(Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka p. 24.7–8). Much of the sixth–seventh-century Usṇ̣īsạ-vijayā
dhāraṇī is entirely comprehensible as a natural language expression, containing,
as it does, such statements as “Asperse me, All you Tathāgatas, with the conse-
crations of the nectar of speech of the Best of Sugatas, with mantra words of
the Great Seal!” (Usṇ̣īsạ-vijayā dhāraṇī, Yuyama, p. 171; Müller and Nanjio,
p. 35: abhisịñcantu māṃ sarvatathāgatāḥ sugatavaravacanāmrṭābhisẹkair
mahāmudrāmantrapadaiḥ). Other vocalizations may be intended to represent
second-person imperative verbs, but it is not quite clear, as in the use of
hara hara, dhara dhara, bhara bhara (e.g. Mahāmāyūrī pp. 37, 46;
Ratnaketuparivarta p. 134; Mahāpratisarā pp. 115–21).
I.ii. Mantra-dhāraṇī discourse markers
One of the more interesting phenomena evident in mantra-dhāraṇīs is the devel-
opment of discourse markers as significant elements – oṃ, tadyathā, and svāhā
being the most important in dhāraṇī use, sometimes accompanied by a lesser
and often later employment of hūṃ and phat.̣ I propose to examine the first two
of these in detail because of their prominence, since one of them (tadyathā) is
found in so manymantra-dhāraṇīs, and they will help establish some of the regu-
lar patterns of use in the case of syllables with reduced or absent semantic value.
The mantras found embedded in dhāraṇī texts reiterate and replicate many of
the functions that previously unfolded in words found in the earlier mantras in
the Brāhmaṇas, the Upanisạds, and generally the Smārta tradition overall,
especially as it was worked out in the Śrautasūtras, the Grḥyasūtras and related
texts. The syllable oṃ in particular exhibits many of the pragmatic principles that
we see employed later in Buddhist dhāraṇī texts, going from a natural-language
expression to discourse marker through a series of transformations. However, as
in the case of mantras generally, the analysis of this has been inhibited by
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theological considerations. Overwhelmingly, Indological discussions have privi-
leged oṃ as a noun, and its division into a-u-m in Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 5.32–4
and elsewhere (Jaiminīya-upanisạd-brāhmaṇa 1.1.5; Mānava-dharmaśāstra
II.76; Wilke and Moebus 2011: 435–8). This theological articulation of the
word as a subject or predicate term in a sentence has occluded its natural
language origin, and indeed it is difficult to find oṃ in a sentence as a natural
lexeme where the wealth of theological values attributed it can be understood
as operative in any cogent sense. It can function either as the subject or predicate
of a theological proposition under such circumstances, but cannot still be
employed in this environment as an interjection, rejoinder, a discourse marker
or any of the other natural language functions it has exhibited.
Earlier scholars have offered several analyses of the syllable, with the primary
semantic assessments being either an affirmative interjection (e.g. Weber 1853:
187–8; Keith 1908–26: 490) or a conjunction equivalent to atha, “then”
(Bloomfield 1890). Parpola (1981) reviewed the evidence and argued correctly
that it was equivalent to an interjection of affirmation, closely related to the affir-
mative interjection ām. He argued that ām/om derived from a Dravidian interjec-
tion of assent, ām, which is said to be itself a modification of ākum.
Furthermore, Parpola has argued that the particle ām experienced a nasalized
vowel, yielding ōm, which eventually produced oṃ. According to this etymol-
ogy, we recover ākum > ām > om > oṃ. The driving mechanism for this
language change is not treated by Parpola, who does not address the question
by employing linguistic tools developed to understand language or phonetic
change in general. In part this was because of the conservative nature of
Indology and in part because linguistics had yet to gain an appreciation of inter-
jections, which remain relatively neglected particles whether in English or any
other language (Ameka 1992a).
Whatever its etymology may prove to be, oṃ certainly has a conventionalized
semantic field of affirmation or assent, and its early uses are consistently
glossed in that manner, even if they occur in formalized ritual expressives in
the Yajur-veda (Vājasaneyi-saṃhitā 2.13: oṃ pratisṭḥa “yes, advance!”;
Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 4.1.11: oṃ śrāvaya “yes, announce!”; 4.9.2: om indra-
vantaḥ pracarata, “yes, you with Indra, advance!”; 4.9.21: oṃ vā oṃ vā oṃ
vā e ai svarṇajyotiḥ, “yes, indeed! yes, indeed! yes, indeed! e, ai, yes golden
light”). However, two environments remain unexplored: the variation of
employment of oṃ in dialogical examples with the implicatures of meaning
that are not quite so conventionalized, and the historical process of change
that the syllable has undergone. In going from its early position as an inter-
jection, oṃ has gone through gradient grammaticalization and has become a
pragmatic marker, indicating specific kinds of ritual speech acts.42 These are
relatively regular linguistic developments.
42 Sean Gleason reminds me that “grammaticalization” is not uncontested as a theoretical
construct about the convergence of language change processes, and the strong claims
about its status have been challenged; important contributions include Janda (2001),
Joseph (2001) and Newmeyer (2001), published in an issue of Language Sciences dedi-
cated to the problem. I thank Sean Gleason for drawing my attention to these contri-
butions and providing me with the articles.
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In Brḥadāraṇyaka-upanisạd 3.9.1 there is a conversation recorded that
reveals the pragmatics of oṃ in the particular. This well-known section is theo-
logically important for its discussions of the number of divinities. But here, oṃ
is not part of the theology; rather it is part of the exchange between Vidagdha
Śākalya and Yājñavalkya, the latter having proposed that he was the most
learned of brahmans at a gathering hosted by King Janaka of Videha.
atha hainaṃ vidagdhaḥ śākalyaḥ prapraccha kati devā yājñavalkyeti sa
haitayaiva nividā pratipede yāvanto vaiśvadevasya nividy ucyante trayaś
ca trī ca śatā trayaś ca trī ca sahasrety om iti hovāca katy eva devā
yājñvalkyeti
Now Vidagdha Śākalya expressed this question,
“Yājñavalkya, how many gods are there?”
Yājñavalkya replied through specifying the invocation,
“As many as are expressed in the invocation to the All Gods: ‘Three
and three hundred, three and three thousand!’”
[Dissatisfied, Vidagdha Śākalya] continued,
“Yes, no doubt, [om iti hovāca] but exactly how many gods are there,
Yājñavalkya?”
Vidagdha continues interrogating Yājñavalkya on the number of gods, forcing
Yājñavalkya into different replies, “thirty-three” then “six”, then “three”, then
“two”, until finally Yājñavalkya comes down to the conclusion that there is
only one god. In each of his many ripostes, Vidagdha has said “yes, no doubt
(oṃ)” in a similar manner, but remains unsatisfied and pursues his questioning:
“Yes, no doubt, but then exactly which are these ‘Three and three hundred,
three and three thousand’ [mentioned in the Vaiśvadeva invocation]?”
om iti hovāca katame te trayaś ca trī ca śatā trayaś ca trī ca sahasreti
(BAU 3.9.1 also related in Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 14.6.9.1–2)
Here the particle oṃ is very far from the theological properties found specified
elsewhere, where it is aksạra “indestructible” or praṇava “the vibrator” (van
Buitenen 1959). Instead, this is a natural language exchange, immediately recog-
nizable. Vidagdha is one of those scholars who will insistently ask questions,
and Yājñavalkya is a paṇḍita who believes himself to have all the answers.
As is usual in these circumstances, the question-answer form invokes issues
of politeness and “face” (Nevala 2010), but here Vidagdha is unrelenting in
his pursuit and is playing the role of the argumentative Indian: every answer
Yājñavalkya gives is riposted with a “yes but” response, for Vidagdha wishes
to claim the prize of most learned for himself.
Oṃ in this linguistic environment appears to be a developed “primary inter-
jection” in the typology of White and others (White 1963; Ameka 1992a;
Gehweiler 2010). Ameka defines them as “little words or non-words which in
terms of their distribution can constitute an utterance by themselves and do
not normally enter into construction with other word classes, for example,
Ouch, Wow, Gee, Oho, Oops, etc. They could be used as co-utterances with
other units . . . In this usage, they are related to connectors which always
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occur with another utterance – hence their discourse marking functions” (Ameka
1992a: 105, also Ameka 1992b; White 1963: 356; Wilkins 1992). Primary inter-
jections are certainly well known in Sanskrit: āṃ, dhik, aho, ahā, hā, etc.
Moreover, such expressions may be developed to carry other kinds of pragmatic
force, and it appears that oṃ here is operating as a specific kind of primary inter-
jection, a phatic interjection. “Phatic interjections are used in the establishment
and maintenance of communication contact” (Ameka 1992a: 114) and are there-
fore different from other interjections (e.g. expressive, cognitive, conative, etc.).
In this regard, phatic interjections may serve as continuity markers, allowing
agreement by way of continuing the conversation. Such interjections are very
common, and oṃ here operates in a manner roughly similar to how the modern
Hindi interjections of hāñ, ji, tịk and the well-known Indian head-wave gesture
all function to show concert with the speaker, even if substantial agreement is
not really indicated. And in the above conversation, complete agreement is cer-
tainly not implied. The implicature (non-conventional pragmatic meaning) of oṃ
in this conversation is something of the order of, “I understand what is being
said, and I can see what that means, but I still am not completely satisfied
and do not accept your statements at face value”.43 That is also a reason to revisit
Bloomfield’s (1890) argument, that oṃ could be glossed by another primary
phatic interjection, atha “and now”, since the two share certain conversational
continuing functions.
Consequently, the phatic interjection in this application has a politeness com-
ponent, one that allows Vidagdha to pursue the questioning without either rep-
rimand or dismissal, until finally he goes beyond the established limits and
Vidagdha’s head explodes, a fate assigned transgressors, as we have already
seen. In challenging Yājñavalkya’s knowledge, Vidagdha Śākalya is placing
himself in the subordinate position to Yājñavalkya. But Vidagdha is obsessed
with both Yājñavalkya’s presumption to superiority and the cognitive disso-
nance inherent in the various descriptions of the gods; and here the well-attested
Indian desire for a complete determination of the entire category of deva collides
with the ever-shifting descriptions and identities of the deities. So, Vidagdha’s
responses to each of Yājñavalkya’s statements embody a positive affirmation,
oṃ, which the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa vii.18 assigns a status marking. After noting
that the Adhvaryu responds to the rc̣ verses with an oṃ but to the gāthā verses
with a tathā, the text affirms that oṃ is divine whereas tathā is human. Here
Sāyana comments that oṃ, employed with the chandorūpa meter, is the manner
in which one signals agreement to gods; conversely, one signals agreement with
men when employing tathā (om ity etac chandorūpaṃ daivaṃ devair
anġīkārārthe prayujyate | tat tathety antaṃ mānusỵaṃ manusỵā anġīkāre tatheti
śabdaṃ prayuñjate | Sāyana, Aitareya-brahmaṇa cy, p. 859). This has been
taken to identify theological value – and it is certainly implied – but the actual
use we see is sociolinguistic: one employs oṃ to superiors and tathā to equals or
inferiors.
43 Conversational implicatures are explored in Carston 2004.
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This status marking appears important with the grammaticalization of oṃ
when it becomes employed as a discourse marker at the beginning of mantras.44
As already mentioned, the Yajurveda illustrates a ritualized use of oṃ, but there
the interjection is also used as a polite softening of the imperative. The
Vājasaneyi directive oṃ pratisṭḥa “Yes, advance!” is said to the sacrificer
by the Brahman, to indicate that he has been accepted by Savitr,̣ who urges
that he should give his fire stick.45 Parpola (1981: 200) points out that oṃ intro-
duces the imperative in the sense of prasava, “assent or permission”. It also has
the pragmatic value of turning an imperative into a polite request.46 As we have
seen, bare imperatives (lot)̣ are the most direct of directives, and the prefix oṃ
here renders it less forceful even if just as authoritative. Consequently, oṃ facili-
tates the retention of face and softens the illocutionary force, a mark of
politeness.
Because it became placed at the beginning of imperatives as a pragmatic
status marker, when later mantras began to be articulated, oṃ was apparently
carried through. At that moment, it no longer functioned as an affirmative
phatic interjection, but was grammaticalized into a discourse marker.
Grammaticalization is a process whereby a word becomes part of a grammatical
code, and undergoes change as a result. As Hopper and Traugott (2003: xv)
express it: “we now define grammaticalization as the change whereby lexical
items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve gram-
matical functions and, once grammaticalized, continue to develop new gramma-
tical functions”. In the case of oṃ, it becomes a marker of sanctity at the advent
of the recitation of a text or phrase, and in the process oṃ exhibits a classic mark
of grammaticalization: a shift of value from semantic to pragmatic.47
Thus, grammaticalization is sometimes understood to entail a “bleaching” of
semantic value (Roberts 2010). In this instance, the previous conventionalized
semantic force of oṃ that allows it to operate as an affirmative phatic interjection
is lessened and endowed with grammatical reference that in some measure les-
sens its lexical value. Such a model of semantic bleaching would seem to res-
onate with the alteration in the function and placement of oṃ, pointing to
44 Janda (2001: 304–15) has argued that grammaticalization discussions often ignore the
sociolinguistic attributes, which can often better explain language change, and certainly
here status and politeness are important variables.
45 The duties of the Brahman priest to give such directions are noted by Parpola 1981: 200.
Mahīdhara’s cy to Vājasaneyī-saṃhitā Mādhyandinya Śuklayajurveda 2.13: om ity
aṅgīkārārthaḥ | tathāstu | pratisṭḥa prayāṇaṃ kuru | samidādhānakāle
yajamānasyābhipretaṃ prayāṇam avagamya savitā devo ’ṅgīkrṭya prayāṇe prerayatīty
arthaḥ |.
46 Politeness in classical Sanskrit literature sometimes implicates the use of interjections;
see van der Walle 1993, esp. pp. 126–7.
47 Āpastambhīya-dharmasūtra I.4.13.6; Mānava-dharmaśāstra II.70–4; Gautama-
dharmasūtra I.49–58; Visṇ̣usṃrṭi 55.15; Śānk̇hāyanagrḥyasūtra 4.8, etc. The transition
from om to oṃ may also be a function of another change observed in grammaticalization:
phonetic erosion (coalescence), wherein there is the loss of some phonetic value; see
Lehmann 2002: 132. But this is a bit dubious in this instance, and I would be hesitant
to make the argument. Generally, phonetic erosion occurs during the transition from
independent syllables to bound forms, as in the modern pronunciation of “going to” to
“gonna”.
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what comes after instead of replying to what has come before. In signalling the
sanctity of the following text, oṃ becomes a discourse marker, described by
Brinton (2010: 285–6) as having the following attributes:
They are phonologically “short” items that preferentially occur in
sentence-initial position . . . Semantically, discourse markers are seen as
having little or no semantic content: they are non-referential/non-
propositional in meaning (although historically they typically derive
from lexemes with full semantic content, and may retain traces of the orig-
inal proposition meaning of these lexemes). Some discourse markers, but
not all, express procedural (inferential) rather conceptual meaning . . .
Finally, it has been observed that discourse markers, because of their
lack of semantic content, pose difficulties for translation.
But Hopper and Traugott (2003: 94–8) have argued that grammaticalization
actually marks a shift of meaning instead, so that, in the case of oṃ, the new
function as a discourse marker replaces the semantic value of a lexical item
with the function value of a grammatical particle. There is much to be said
for that, given that oṃ assumes two mutually exclusive properties; not only
does it become a discourse marker for the advent of a mantra, but conversely
becomes equipped with an entire theology when treated as a noun. That is, in
the overwhelming number of instances of the use of oṃ, it is simply a place
holder that marks the beginning of the sacred phrase, yet there is little semantic
value in its position. This is, in part, a function of its routinization as well:
“Signal simplification typically results from the routinization (idiomatization)
of expressions” (Hopper and Traugott 2003: 72) Certainly, given the ubiquity
that oṃ assumes in the early medieval period, there can be little doubt that it
becomes de-semanticized in some measure. While grammaticalization has
been proposed as an irreversible process, so that the original word can no longer
operate with its original syntactic function or semantic value, this model is con-
tested (e.g. Janda 2001: 291–303), and in our instance it does not seem to be
entirely the case. Oṃ was not immediately eclipsed in ordinary language situ-
ations, for outside of the religious sphere, oṃ continued to be employed as a
phatic interjection at least into the early medieval period.48 Even in the modern
period, the relatively common North Indian Vaisṇ̣ava expression “Hari oṃ!”
appears to retain semantic echoes of the earlier phatic interjection.
The above extended investigation of oṃ was engaged to signal some of the
many pragmatic attributes of the mantra-dhāraṇīs overall, but similar functions
are notable in two words that have been consistently employed in Buddhist
mantra-dhāraṇīs: tadyathā and svāhā. It is a curious fact that most of the
early Buddhist mantra-dhāraṇīs do not seem to employ the syllable oṃ.
Neither the received texts of the early Mahāyāna sūtras, nor the early trans-
lations into Chinese seem definitively to use the syllable. Part of the problem
in determining this is the normative use of 唵 (ǎn) to represent oṃ, although
48 Brḥatkathāślokasaṃgrha 5.218: grḥyatām iti tenokte | viśvilenoktam om iti ‖5.218|;
gaṇikāmātur ādeśam | om iti pratyapūjayam ‖18.116|; Mālatīmādhava prose after 6.7
bhavatv om ity ucyatām amātyaḥ – although most editions read evam for om here.
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it is sometimes transcribed by phonetically related characters (e.g. 菴).
Both of these, however, are also used to identify other sounds, especially in
mantras, so while we have mantras with the syllable ǎn 唵 from the
Drumakinnararāja-pariprc̣chā (T. 624.15.367a2) translation attributed to
Lokaksẹma, they apparently have other values, given their rendering in other
Chinese and Tibetan translations.49 Other early translations are equally con-
flicted, such as the two Mahāmāyūrī anonymous translations of 350–431 CE.
In each of these, the character 菴 is found once (T. 986.19.477c22,
T. 987.19.480a5) but this appears to signal a syllable like am or some similar
pronunciation. Arguably, the earliest version of the Mahāmāyūrī mantra is
found in the Bhaisạjyavastu of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, and there is no
use of oṃ reflected there.50 Even in the extensive received Sanskrit text, oṃ
is found in but three places, and none of them appear to be reflected in the ear-
liest versions.51 I have not been able to find a secure use of oṃ in any Buddhist
context prior to the anonymous translations into Chinese thought to date from
the early sixth century. In works like the Saptabuddhaka, however – triangulat-
ing between the Liang translation (502–557 CE), the 587 CE translation attributed
to Jñānagupta and the Tibetan canonical translation – the oṃ in the healing man-
tra oṃ hulu hulu is certain; other mantras also include oṃ in that scripture.52
Similar evidence is available from the *Mūlyamantra (anon. 502–557 CE) for
which we also have Gilgit fragments, a 706 CE translation by Bodhiruci II and
a Tibetan canonical version.53 The apparent conclusion is that oṃ per se is
not firmly attested in the first centuries of the mantra-dhāraṇī texts.
Instead, the discourse marker function is often held by tadyathā and svāhā,
and of the two, the former is the more distinctive. Tadyathā also went through
a process of grammaticalization, and its path is more in keeping with the devel-
opment of discourse forms, since it was never laden with the theology found in
oṃ. Tadyathā is apparently not a word found in the Vedic saṃhitās, for it is
neither listed in Franceschini’s 2005 enlargement of Bloomfield’s Vedic
Concordance nor is it found in Whitney’s (1881) “Index verborum”. However,
it does occur in a few of the Brāhmaṇas, and the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa is particu-
larly helpful in illuminating the development of the term.
Tadyathā begins without being a strictly bound term, and simply indicates the
anaphoric deictic “that” (tat) in proximity to the relative cataphoric deictic of
49 Druma-kinnara-rāja-pariprc̣chā-sūtra pp. 295–7. See Harrison and Coblin 2012.
50 Bhaisạjyavastu, Gilgit Manuscripts III/2 pp. 287–8.
51 Mahāmāyūrī pp. 4–5, 37.21, 61.18.
52 Saptabuddhaka, T. 1333.21.561c11–14, 562a4–8, 562b1–5, 563a7–12, 563b17–24,
563c27–564a2; these roughly correspond to Bodhiruci’s T.1334.21.565a29–b3,
565b19–22, 565c13–16, 566a21–26, 566b22–28, 566c24–28; and to To. 270, mdo-sde
ya, fols. 14a3, 14b1, 14b7–15a1, 15b4–5, 16a6–b1, 16b7–17a1, and 17a6–7; we note
that the Tibetan has more mantras than either Chinese translation. Wayman (1985: 38)
interprets hulu hulu as an imperative of “to shout with joy”, but this appears hermeneutic
rather than linguistic.
53 There are many instances in the *Mūlyamantra, e.g., T. 1007.19.659b02; T.
1006.19.636b19; To. 506, rgyud-’bum vol. da, fol. 286b7. For the Gilgit fragments of
this and related texts, see Matsumura 1983. This text will be the subject of a future study.
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manner, “in the manner that” (yathā). In Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 2.37 the unbound,
envelope form (tad āhur yathā) occurs three times. This paragraph begins by
indicating a relationship between the recitation of two kinds of verse: stotra
and śastra, the former sung whereas the latter is chanted. Each has two varieties,
and the text tries to unravel a trope employed in Vedic literature that the sacrifice
is the gods’ chariot, with the stotra as the outer reins of the two horses and the
śastra verses as the inner reins. In the same manner that the pairs of outer and
inner reins are separated into right and left so as not to confuse the horses, the
stotra and śastra chants are separated by application, pavamāna and ājya in the
former case, praüga and ājya in the latter.54 The simile intrudes on the instruc-
tions, which are that “with respect to that [metaphor] they said, ‘indeed, accord-
ing to the stotra, so too the śastra’” (tad āhur yathā vāva stotram evaṃ
śastram). The text struggles to harmonize the simile (which should indicate
that stotra and śastra simultaneously co-operate, as the right inner rein and
the left outer rein are worked in union) with the instruction (śastra following
after stotra) and the problem of manner (yathā), since the stotra is sung and
the śastra is chanted.
For our purposes, though, the words tad and yathā operate in different direc-
tions and for different purposes in the initial two phrases – they have yet to
become lexicalized into a single, bound form, nor have they been grammaticalized
into a specific place position (reduced syntagmatic variability).55 Aitareya-
brāhmaṇa 2.37 continues by applying the simile to the relationship of śastra
verses and those of the yājya offering: “They said, ‘indeed, according to the
śastra so too the yājya to Agni; the Hotr ̣ lauds with the ājya verse”. (tad āhur
yathā vāva śastram evaṃ yājyāgneyaṃ hotājyaṃ śanṡaty). After discussing this
relation, however, in the final statement, the “they said” is elided and the two
words are joined, “That [the śastra is intoned silently by the Hotr]̣ means as
the śastra so the yājyā consecration verse (tadyathaiva śastram evaṃ yājyā)”.56
Here there is only a hint at the grammaticalization that will occur, since the
phrase is a contraction of the previous one (tad āhur yathā vāva śastram evam
yājyā), but tadyathā begins to be employed as a discourse marker of enumeration
54 Aitareya-brāhmaṇa, Aufrecht, p. 55: devaratho vā esạ yad yajñas tasyaitāv antarau raśmī
yad ājyapraüge | tad yad ājyena pavamānam anusạṅsati praügeṇājyaṃ devarathasyaiva
tad antarau raśmī viharaty alobhāya tām anukrṭim manusỵarathasyaivāntarau raśmī
viharaty alobhāya nāsya devaratho lubhyati na manusỵaratho ya evaṃ veda tad āhur
yathā vāva stotram evaṃ śastram | See also Ṣaḍguruśisỵa pp. 382–9.
55 On lexicalization, see Brinton 2005, note p. 62: “Lexicalization is often discussed in iso-
lation from grammaticalization, especially in studies of word formation. However, it has
increasingly been the case that it has entered into grammaticalization studies. One area in
which the linking of lexicalization and grammaticalization is especially apparent is in
work on fusion, including what has been called freezing, univerbation, or bonding,
depending on the type of item that undergoes boundary loss”.
56 This use is similar to that encountered elsewhere in the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa, e.g. 1.11,
1.15, 3.5, 3.18, 3.22, 3.31, 5.9, 5.15–6, 5.22, 5.32–3, 6.17, 6.21, 6.23. Similar forms
are found throughout the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa, e.g., 1.1.4.7, 1.3.3.17, 1.4.4.15, etc.;
see also Taittirīya-brāhmaṇa 2.7.18.4 (vol. 2, p. 466); Pañcaviṃśabrāhmaṇa 16.10.6.
This is mimicked in the much later Gopatha-brāhmaṇa 2.5.10 as well.
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by the end of the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa. In places like Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 7.1, we
find an intermediate point closer to the eventual use.57 There directions on the dis-
memberment of the sacrificial animal (paśor vibhakti) are given along with the
distribution of the parts. Those who do otherwise, then let it be that they rend ani-
mals like thieves or sinners (atha ye ’to ’nyathā tadyathā selagā vā pāpakrṭo vā
paśuṃ vimathnīraṃs tādrḳ tat). Here tadyathā begins to assume the position of a
discourse marker that identifies members of a class, which is the reason that the
author appeared compelled to add “like that” (tādrḳ tat) at the end, which
would be redundant were tadyathā to have retained its earlier semantic value.58
A somewhat similar situation is observable in Mahābhāsỵa1.4.21[1], discussing
two examples of potential confusion of reference when the dual for eyes and
feet is not employed; the two examples are made to follow tadyathā: tadyathā
aksị̄ṇi me darśanīyāni | pādā me sukumārā iti.59 By this time, similar bound dis-
course marker forms appear in Pali (seyyathā) and in Ardhamāgadhī (sejahā,
taṃjahā) as well, suggesting either a linguistic diffusion or that the discourse mar-
kers may have an earlier, unattested common source.60
Tadyathā is not entirely subsumed into a grammatical position quite yet, but
by the time it shows up in classical inscriptions, it has achieved the state recog-
nizable in normative Buddhist Sanskrit use. In the inscriptions of the Vākātạ̄kas,
for example, tadyathā introduces a list of the exemptions allowed brāhmaṇas to
whom land is donated, as in the case of the Jāmb Plates of Pravarasena II.61
yathāsyopacitā[ṃ] pūrvvarājānumatāñ cāturvvaidyagrāmamaryyādā[ṃ]
vitarāmas tadyathā akaradāyī abhatạcchatraprāveśya[ḥ] apārampara-
gobalavardda[ḥ] apusp̣aksị̄rasandoha[ḥ] acārāsanacarmmānġāra[ḥ]
alavaṇakliṇvakreṇikhanakaḥ sarvvavisṭịsaparihāraparihrṭaḥ sanidhiḥ
sopanidhi[ḥ] saklrp̣topāklrp̣ta[ḥ] ācandrādityakālīyaḥ putrapautrānu
[gā]mikaḥ bhuñjato
Mirashi translates this:
And We grant the following exemptions which are incidental to a village
bestowed on a Brāhmaṇa proficient in the four Vedas and are appropriate,
as approved by former kings: – It is not to pay taxes; it is not to be entered
by soldiers and policemen; it does not entitle (the State) to customary cows
57 Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 4.27, 8.20 also exhibit partial lists.
58 Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 4.4 also employs tādrḳ tat following the comparison.
59 In distinction, in Mahābhāsỵa 2.3.3 tadyathā introduces individual examples, which are
then explained.
60 Pischel 1981 § 423; taṃjahā is very common in the Jaināgamas; Āyāraṃgasutta 1.2, 1.4,
etc.; Aupapātikasūtra §§ 5, 28, 30, etc.; while the Milindapañha often employs seyyathā,
the prose begins with taṃyathā ‘nusūyate, possibly the intrusion of a later form;
Milindapañha 1.13.
61 Mirashi (1963, CII V, p. 13 lines 24–9; trans. p. 14). This paragraph is common in the
Vākātạka inscriptions; see the Belor Plates of Pravarsena, p. 20, lines 19–22; the
Chammak Plates of Pravarasena II, p. 24, lines 25–30; the Indore Plates of
Pravarasena II, pp. 40–41, lines 19–24; the Patṭạn Plates of Pravarasena II, pp. 60–61,
lines 29–34, etc.
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and bulls; it does not (also) entitle it to (royalties on) flowers and milking;
it is exempt from (the obligation to provide) grass, hides as seats and char-
coal (to touring royal officers); it is exempt from (royalties on) the pur-
chase of fermenting liquors and digging of salt; it is free from all kinds
of forced labour; it is donated together with (the right to) hidden treasures
and deposits (and) together with major and minor taxes; it is to be enjoyed
as long as the sun and the moon (will endure) and it is to follow the suc-
cession of sons and son’s sons.
Thus tadyathā becomes grammaticalized from a non-bound anaphoric deictic (tat
that) added to a cataphoric deictic of manner (yathā just as) into a bound form
with a distinctive function: “to whit”, “that is to say”, “id est (i.e.)”, and any num-
ber of related forms. In the specifically Buddhist mantra-dhāraṇī use, it has a
more identifiable function – it is a marker that often introduces the beginning
of all or a distinctive part of the mantra, much as svāhā signals the completion
of the section. Accordingly, it acts very much in the manner of oṃ elsewhere,
and may even be matched with it, as in the late Sarvathathāgatādhisṭḥāna
(§37: namaḥ sarvabuddhānāṃ sarvabodhisattvārhantānāṃ tadyathā oṃ vajrad-
hara vajradhara, etc.). However, in the early Buddhist mantras, tadyathā and
svāhā are the preferred inaugurating and completing signs. In the Central Asian
dhāraṇīs edited by von Hinüber, they become formulaic.
namo aksọbhyā[ya] tathāgatāya tadyathā [male] male jyoti svāhā ‖
namo amitābhāya tathāgatāya tadyathā amr[̣te am]rṭobhate amrṭasaṃb-
have amitagaganakīrtakare svāhā ‖
Von Hinüber 1987/88: 233
Other dhāraṇīs are a little more complex, but most often they follow in this same
pattern: “Homage [Buddha/Bodhisattva name here, dative case] tadyathā [various
mantra syllables] svāhā.” This is not always observed, and there are
mantra-dhāraṇīs that place the/a homage immediately before the svāhā, but they
tend to be the exception. Occasionally, tadyathā is replaced by another marker, as
in the case of the Mahāsāhasrapardanī’s and Suvarṇabhāsottama’s employment
of syād yathedam instead.62 Even then, if the precise discourse marker has been
replaced, the discourse marker pragmatic function and position remain intact.
In most Buddhist mantra-dhāraṇīs, svāhā is the discourse closure marker,
although other markers, including hūṃ and phat,̣ have alternatively been
employed. The etymology of svāhā is most often identified as “well said”
(su + āha), also a bound form, but it is further recognized that svāhā is closely
related to svadhā. Smārta texts generally affirm that svāhā is to be used in
offerings to the gods whereas svadhā is employed for the ancestors
(Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra 2.6.11.2–3, Āpastambīya-dharmasūtra 1.13.1; but
see Brḥaddevatā 8.111–12). Be that as it may, the function of svāhā in
Buddhist contexts is also a discourse marker, this time indicating closure.
62 Mahāsāhasrapramardanī, pp. 4.23, 5.8, 5.24, 6.11, 6.23, 18.13, 19.2, 19.21, etc.,
Suvarṇabhāsottama 106.8, 108.11, 117.6–7.
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Unfortunately, there is little in the way of evidence for the actual formation of
svāhā, since both svāhā and svadhā arrive in Ṛgveda X.14.3 in their current
form, but it is possible that both derive from an older Indic ritual vocalization,
phonetically differentiated from each other as their functions became differen-
tiated. And in fact, none of the other mantra-dhāraṇī discourse markers can
be as well mapped as oṃ and tadyathā.
The Buddhists, certainly, employed svāhā as it was already formulaic, and they
most likely obtained their impetus from rules of mantra formation found in the
Grḥyasūtras. So the Khādiragrḥyasūtra indicates that homas are offered with
svāhā at the end of their mantras (Khādiragrḥyasūtra 1.1.19: svāhāntā mantrā
homesạ). Similarly, the Hiraṇyakeśigrḥya-sūtra declares that mantras are always
to have svāhā at their conclusion (Hiraṇyakeśigrḥya-sūtra 1.3.2: mantrānte nityaḥ
svāhākāraḥ) and goes on to add that new mantras may be manufactured for deities
for which there is no mantra, simply by adding svāhā (1.3.3: amantrāsu amusṃai
svāhā | iti yathādevatam). These kinds ofmantra rules (mantraparibhāsạ̄) provided
the guidance necessary for Buddhists to formulate their new mantra-dhāraṇīs as
they began to develop a deeper involvement with such phrases.
I.iii. Mantra-dhāraṇī non-referential or non-lexical phonemes
Even accounting for observable sentences, stray nouns and verbs, interjections,
exclamations and discourse markers, we are left with the fact that a great number
of the syllables do not represent any words with known semantic values or ident-
ifiable markers with pragmatic force. Some may be drawn from Dravidian
languages, as Bernhard (1967) argued, but he was not correct in assessing
them as mnemonic devices – they only become mantra-dhāraṇīs when no
longer recognizable. Indeed, the entire discussion of mantra-dhāraṇīs in the
Bodhisattvabhūmi relies on the idea that such phrases are not referential (anar-
tha), in the argument I presented previously (Davidson 2009). There, apparently
Dravidian-based words – itị mitị kitị – are articulated as part of the example, and
the Mahāmāyūrī in three places recognizes that it employs similar Dravidian
words (Mahāmāyūrī: ili misti kili misti ili kili misti ili me sidhyantu drāmiḍā
mantrapadāḥ, pp. 9.18, 14.7, 44.18; see also Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka 39.1–3:
Sarvajñatākāra-dhāraṇī 16.1, 19.8). We also have traces of Prakritic words in
the recognizable nouns (e.g. istrī for strī, śiri for śrī), so we may assume that
some of the syllables are drawn from that source as well.63
It would be disingenuous not to acknowledge that mantra-dhāraṇī “words”
are predominantly not natural language events. That leaves the possibility – to
be explored in detail elsewhere – that these non-natural language syllables are
graphic representations of a vocalization that has both similarities and dissimila-
rities to glossolalia or to other recorded forms of non-language vocalization. It is
difficult to frame otherwise the kind of repetitive non-linguistic expressions we
find in so many mantra-dhāraṇīs: veduri veduri vedurī matṭịte matṭịte kotị kotị
vidyumati hu hu hu hu hu hu hu hu cu cu cu cu cu cu cu cu ru ru ru ru ru ru ru
63 Ratnaketuparivarta p. 42.1 istrībhāva; Von Hinüber 1987/88: 236: namo śrīpradīpāya |
tadyathā śiri śiri pradīpaśiri svāhā ‖
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ru ca ca ca ca ca ca ca ca sa svāhā (Mahāmāyūrī p. 17). While such phrases
were justified in doctrinal or theological terms, they cannot be assigned value
as either lexemes or operators in sentences.
I.iv. Mantra-dhāraṇīs as acts of truth
Skilling (1992: 144–6) noted that Buddhist spell literature includes references to
mantras or dhāraṇīs as statements or professions of truth (satyavacana,
satyavākya, satyādhisṭḥāna), a Sanskritic Buddhist use that is closely related to
cognate expressions in Pali (saccakiriyā) and Vedic (satyakriyā). As a trope for
the affirmation of virtue or supernormal ability, professions of truth are scattered
throughout Buddhist literature, and have been studied in significant detail (e.g.
Wakahara 2002). When a person makes a profession of truth, it commonly entails
the manipulation of reality: the extinguishing of a fire, bringing of rain, removal of
poison or the reversing of the course of the River Ganges, to name but a few. As
in the case of our directives (A. above), they most often make use of the impera-
tive, and have been typified in the Milindapañha in that way:
ye keci siddhā saccam anugāyanti | visaṃ halāhalaṃ agadaṃ bhavatū’ti |
tesaṃ saha saccam-anugītena visaṃ halāhalaṃ khaṇena agadaṃ bhavati |
Milindapañha 120.32–121.3
Those siddhas who chant a truth, “May the halāhala poison become medi-
cine!” for them the halāhala poison becomes instantly transformed intomedi-
cine with their chanting of that truth.
Apparently, because of the manner in which phrases mutated into spells, the
power of truth became identified with mantras or vidyās as statements of
truth. For our purposes, the clearest application is when a mantra or dhāraṇī
references itself as a profession of truth. The Sambuddhamantra in the
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna (4.4) concludes with such an affirmation:
etena satyavākyena svasty ānandāya bhiksạve |
By this act of truth, let health return to Ānanda!
Similarly, the longish mantra in the Sarvatathāgatādhisṭḥāna (§56), contains
within itself a phrase:
ya tvayā pūrve satyādhisṭḥānaṃ krṭam tena satyena sarvāśāṃme paripūraya |
And that professionof truth that youperformedpreviously, by that truthmayall
my desire be fulfilled!
Stronger still is the mantra statement addressed to Sarasvatī in the
Suvarṇabhāsottama:
āvāhayāmi mahādevīṃ buddhasatyena dharmasatyena saṃghasatyena
indrasatyena varuṇasatyena ye loke satyavādinaḥ santi tesạṃ
satyavādināṃ satyavacanena āvāhayāmi mahādevīm |
Suvarṇabhāsottama p. 109.7–10
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I invoke the Great Goddess [Sarasvatī] by the truth of the Buddha, of the
Dharma, of the Saṃgha, of Indra, and of Varuṇa! All those who are speak-
ers of truth in the world, by the expressions of truth of these speakers of
truth, I invoke the Great Goddess!
Thompson’s perceptive analysis of the Indic usage indicates that it is a perfor-
mative utterance that affirms the authority of the principle in the statement.64
What seems to be fundamental, in all contexts [both Vedic and
non-Vedic], is that the satyakriyā, is an assertion of personal authority,
an assertion that rests on the power of the performer to accomplish some-
times very remarkable things – as we will see – by the mere utterance of
certain words, and in a recognizably regular and formal way.
Thompson 1998: 125–6
This is certainly true in the broader picture of the event, and observable in the
case of the Asṭạsāhasrikā and Asṭạ̄daśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā texts, which
makes an expression of truth a touchstone of whether a Bodhisattva is irrevers-
ible or not. If the Bodhisattva is, then he is capable of extinguishing a fire by the
mere expression of speech. However, if the fire jumps around, going from build-
ing to building and not really being extinguished, then he is not irreversible and
must continue to cultivate the path (Asṭạsāhasrikā 189–91; Asṭạ̄daśasāhasrikā
5–7). Both scriptures even leverage this trope by warning the Bodhisattva
against hubris: Māra might come along and, while the Bodhisattva performs
an exorcism expecting this expression of truth to validate his spiritual standing,
Māra could expel the wayward spirit, leaving the Bodhisattva to become proud
and self-important. Operating on the same principles (but in reverse), Hara has
examined literary devices wherein acts of truth operate as validation of the per-
son when wrongfully accused, so that gods or elements of reality are called on to
vindicate the character’s innocence (Hara 2009).
The evaluation of Buddhist mantra-dhāraṇīs as statements of truth is compli-
cated by the non-linguistic sounds included in these phrases, as mentioned
before (I.iii). Even then, it is apparent that Buddhists may employ them as direc-
tives, since there is most frequently an imperative that commands or implores
some figure, explicit or not, to perform the function encoded in the
mantra-dhāraṇī, as we saw in the case of Sarasvatī. Other examples are legion,
but this one might be cited from the Mahāmegha-sūtra:
namo bhagavate mama svasti bhavatu sarvasattvānāṁ maitrī bhavatu |
sarvabhūtesṿ abhayaṁ bhavatu | sarvatiryyaggatānāṁ śāmyantu
sarvadurgatayaḥ | namaḥ sarvanivāraṇaviskambhiṇe | sidhyatv ayaṁ
sarvatathāgatavidhiḥ | sarvabuddhāvalokitavidhiḥ | tadyathā | sphatạ
[x7] svāhā |
Mahāmegha 310.5–8
64 It is appropriate to point out that Searle (1989: 536) has protested this assignment of the
term “performative” to all speech acts, and he reserves it for ritualized sentences that are
predominantly declaratives.
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Homage to the Lord! May he be beneficial for me! May he be loving to all
beings! May there be fearlessness among all spirits! May the difficult des-
tinies be pacified for all those born among animals! Homage to
Sarvanivāraṇavisḳambhin [sic]! May this ritual of all the Tathāgatas be
accomplished, and the ritual of the Vision of all Buddhas! That is to
say, “Sphatạ [x7] svāhā!”
We even find the rather bizarre expressive and directive to nasty brahmans in the
Mahāmāyūrī,
ye brāhmaṇā vāhitapāpadharmāḥ teśāṃ namas | te mama sarvasatvānāṃ
ca raksạ̄ṃ kurvantu|
Mahāmāyūrī 42.20–21
All those brahmans invested in sinful duties, homage to them! Let them
protect me and all sentient beings.
Thus, the idea of a mantra-dhāraṇī as an act of truth expresses several somewhat
problematic questions. First, it is evident that many of them cannot be truth in
the sense of truth-conditional semantics, for at least some do not exclusively
express statements comprehensible in natural language. Second, their presump-
tion of efficacy appears dependent on the narrative of initial expression, and the
needs of the individual in the subject case of that narrative. In this instance, as
Thompson has pointed out, the direction of fit is to refashion the world into a
vessel that is in accord with the intention and desire of the speaker, who speaks
the words of the Buddha through his own mouth. In Searle’s terms (Searle 1979:
3–20; Searle and Vanderveken 1985: 92–8) that implicates, as in the case of all
directives, a world to the word fit, so that the words of the mantra-dhāraṇī oper-
ate to express the intention of the Buddha and alter the nature of reality. We must
surmise that, in the cases where the explicit “truthfulness” of the utterance is out-
side of linguistic parameters, it was understood to be a coded expression that
contained extra-linguistic meaning. This must have been true, whether it
meant the compression of significance from the compendium of the scriptures
overall (as seen in some texts; Davidson 2009) or from the specific intention
of the Buddha(s) to effect discrete changes in the structure of reality on behalf
of the believers, as seen in the use of most mantra-dhāraṇīs.
Little wonder that the “statement of truth” language is expressed in but a
minority of such texts, and that, at a later day, we see that Ānanda is told in
the Vasudhārādhāraṇī that it was Sucandra’s great faith that caused the
effects witnessed (Vasudhārādhāraṇī p. 146: śrāddhānanda sucandro
nāma grḥapatiḥ paramaśrāddhaḥ). On a different trajectory, in several
mantras the Sarvatathāgatādhisṭḥāna replaces satyādhisṭḥānena with
tathāgatādhisṭḥānena or buddhādhisṭḥānena (§§ 31, 38, 70); twice it even places
the two forms side-by-side (§§ 56, 87). These late texts suggest that the authors
wished to argue that it is by the authority or truth of the Buddha that transform-
ations to the nature of reality are effected. Thus, we see the older satyakriyā dis-
course fading to the point that it is intermittently supplanted by the new theistic
devotionalism, the leitmotif of India from the Gupta period forward.
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Conclusion: Encoded suppositions and expectations
The purpose of this study was to bring to bear some of the tools of historical
pragmatics, so that the formalized statements in Buddhist dhāraṇī literature
could be evaluated. The macro results are found below in Appendix A, which
examines how the forms A–I discussed in the essay are employed in the individ-
ual texts, indicating the overall Buddhist use of pragmatics in dhāraṇī literature.
However, this table should be used with caution, for some of the instances of the
individual statements could easily be contested or otherwise interpreted, and the
sample is equally quite limited, representing but a small fraction of the corpus of
dhāraṇī texts or chapters. In keeping with this cautionary admonition, the lim-
ited goal of this application was simply a better understanding of the dynamics
and structure of these texts, so that their development and evolution might be
better mapped out. The other goal was to determine if nomothetic linguistic
tools can be effectively brought to bear on the evaluation of dhāraṇī texts, rather
that inventing, on the spot, a typology of dubious validity, neither really emic
nor etic, or invoking emic typologies exclusively. In this instance, the applica-
bility of pragmatics analysis to Buddhist dhāraṇī textual statements affirms
their place within the parameters of normative language and vocalization use,
rather than standing outside of it.
Just as important, we may conclude from the exercise yielding Appendix A that
the dhāraṇī genre is highly formalized and, to a degree, formulaic. Whatever their
initial impetus, dhāraṇīs became a commonly affirmed genre of texts by means of
establishing a formal horizon of expectations by which the genre would be known.
Their explicit goals were protection of individuals and communities, healing from
disease and catastrophe, the mitigation of prior karma and the liberation of the per-
son from soteriological bondage. Their implicit goals were the further integration
of Buddhist practices into the evolving cosmos of Indian ritual, both Brahmanical
and folk ritual, which had developed a dynamic relationship to mantras, however
these were understood. Their method was to establish a series of phrases that were
considered to encode truth, whatever that may have meant, but the encoding was
framed in a formal presentation that may be explored by pragmatic analysis. In this
regard, we may conclude that Buddhist dhāraṇī texts work in pragmatic patterns
recognizable cross-culturally, even if they have distinctive attributes and values
that extend from their specific origins.
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I.iv..
Dhāraṇī text A B C D E F G H I.i I.ii I.iii I.iv
Amoghapāśa-hrḍaya S W S M M S M M M
Ātạ̄nātịka-sūtra M S M M S M M
Bhaisạjyavastu S M S S M M M
Buddhanāmasahasrapañcaśatacaturtri-
pañcadaśa-sūtra (Hinüber Dhāraṇīs )
M M M M
Ekādaśamukha-hrḍaya M M M M M M M M
Gaṇapatihrḍaya M M M M M
Hayagrīvavidyā S S S S M
Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka M M M M M M M M
Mahāmāyūrī S M M M M M S M M M S
Mahāmantrānusāriṇī M M S M M W
Mahāmegha-sūtra S M M W M M M M M
Mahāpratisarā-dhāraṇī M S M M M M M M M
Mahāsāhasrapramardanī S M M M M M M M M M M M
Mahāśītavatī-dhāraṇī S S S M M M S M M M
Mekhalādhāraṇī S S S W M M M M M
Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī S W S
Ratnaketuparivarta M M M M M M M M M M M
Saddharmapuṇḍarīka M M M M M M M M
Ṣaṇmukhadhāraṇī S M S M M M
Śārdūlakarṇāvadāna S S M M S M M M S
Sarvajñatākāra-dhāraṇī S M M M M M M M M
Sarvatathāgatādhisṭḥāna-satvāvalokana-
buddhaksẹtrasandarśana-vyūha
W M M M M M M M M M M M
Suvarṇabhāsottama M M M M M M M M M
Usṇ̣īsạ-vijayā dhāraṇī S M M M
Vajravidāraṇī dhāraṇī M M M M M
Vasudhārā-dhāraṇī S M S S M M M M M M
Key: M =multiple; S = strong presence; W =weak presence; blank cell = no clear presence
In the cases of the lengthy sūtras, the table reflects only statements made in the dhāraṇī sections, unless there are dhāraṇīs scattered throughout the text, as in the Ratnaketuparivarta.
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Abhidharmasamuccayabhāsỵa. Tatia, Nathmal. 1976. Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāsỵam.
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Śrimat Sāyaṇāchārya. (Ānandāśrama Sanskrita Series, No. 32, part II.)
Keith, Arthur Berriedale (trans.) 1920. Rigveda Brahmanas: The Aitareya and
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from the Commentary of Mātrịdatta. Vienna.
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of Mahīdhara. Delhi.
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Burgess, James. 1881. Inscriptions from the Cave-Temples of Western India. Bombay.
Carston, Robyn. 2004. “Truth-conditional content and conversational implicature”, in
Claudia Bianchi (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Stanford, CA, 65–100.
Clapp, Lenny. 2009. “The rhetorical relations approach to indirect speech acts: problems
and prospects”, Pragmatics & Cognition 17/1: 43–76.
Cohen, Richard S. 2006. “Ajanta’s inscriptions”, in Walter M. Spink, Ajanta: History
and Development, vol. 2: Arguments about Ajanta. Leiden, 273–339.
Copp, Paul. 2008. “Notes on the term ‘Dhāraṇī’ in medieval Chinese Buddhist thought”,
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